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For years, scholars have documented the national crisis in indigent
defense and its many tragic implications, and yet the crisis persists.
Traditionally, the appellate and political processes were the exclusive
avenues for indigent defense reform, and each suffered from critical
infirmities. By the 1970s, individuals and groups began to seek prospective
judicial reform of indigent defense systems. Widely used in other arenas,
systemic suits based on the Sixth Amendment have been few in number
and, at least in their early form, relatively unsuccessful. Other scholars
have provided a descriptive account of structural litigation to improve
indigent defense, and this article takes those accounts one step further by
distilling from the recent body of suits a model for indigent defense
litigation. In particular, this article divides suits of this kind into "first-
generation" and "second-generation" suits-a distinction that is largely
chronological, but phenomenological to an extent, as well. First-
generation suits were reactive and sought limited relief from the courts. In
contrast, second-generation suits are marked by their empirical grounding,
extensive alliances of support, and requests for sweeping reform. These
second-generation suits have been far more successful than their
predecessor suits, and this article contends that these suits are emblematic
of a model that future suits can replicate. Finally, this article discusses
specific issues for litigants of third-generation suits to consider, in
particular the pursuit of a federal forum. At the same time, the article
recognizes that this type of litigation is neither a panacea nor uniformly
available, and the article concludes by offering advice for the individual
defense attorney who is working in the midst of a public defense crisis.
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INTRODUCTION
Poor people account for more than eighty percent of individuals
prosecuted in this country,1 and in most instances these indigent
defendants receive subpar legal assistance when they receive it at all.2 As
* Assistant Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America. I received helpful comments from Elena Baylis, Marshall Breger, Robin
Dahlberg, Amanda Frost, Adam Gershowitz, Benjamin Herman, Amanda Leiter, Bo
Rutledge, Justin Smith, and David Zaring, as well as valuable research assistance from
Molly Brottmiller. This article was supported by a grant from the Dean's Research Fund,
and a preliminary version of this article was presented for discussion at the Southeastern
Association of Law Schools' New Scholars Workshop in July 2008.
1. Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A
National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034 (2006).
2. See STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, ABA, GIDEON'S
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 16-20 (2004)
(attributing inadequate legal representation for indigent defendants to a variety of factors
including incompetent and inexperienced lawyers; excessive caseloads; and lack of
meaningful contact with clients, investigation, research, and conflict-free representation),
available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.
pdf; Backus & Marcus, supra note 1, at 1080-82 (arguing that systemic deficiencies in
indigent defense, such as high caseloads, inadequate training and supervision, and
insufficient resources, compromise defenders' ethical obligations to clients).
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Stephen Bright, founder of the Southern Center for Human Rights, has
asserted: "No constitutional right is celebrated so much in the abstract and
observed so little in reality as the right to counsel."3 And yet, despite
voluminous documentation of the indigent defense crisis, the crisis persists.
In Mississippi, children as young as fourteen are incarcerated with
adults and may wait months to speak to a lawyer.4 Adult defendants far -
no better-in some Mississippi counties, they may wait up to a year to
speak to a court-appointed lawyer about their case.5 A majority of the
people on death row in Alabama were represented by lawyers whose
compensation was statutorily capped at $1000.6 In New York, where
counties select indigent defense lawyers on a low-bid, flat-fee basis,
attorneys are regularly assigned to cases with no regard for their level of
training or experience, and the state provides no supervision or monitoring
of attorney performance.7 In Georgia, the statewide public defense system
has faced one financial crisis after another since its 2005 inception.8 In
January 2009, an indigent capital defendant, who had been without legal
representation for eight months, filed suit against public defense
administrators seeking immediate representation. 9 These examples are
not outliers. Across the nation-from Maine1" to Arizonal-many states
are facing acute crises in indigent defense.
Inadequate funding is the root cause of the indigent defense crisis.
12
There are other salient attributes to the indigent defense crisis, as the
examples above demonstrate, but chronic underfunding is the common
3. Stephen B. Bright, Turning Celebrated Principles Into Reality, CHAMPION, Jan.-
Feb. 2003, at 6.
4. NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDuC. FUND, ASSEMBLY LINE JUSTICE: MISSISSIPPI'S
INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 6 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/ms-assemblylinejustice.pdf.
5. Id.
6. Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to
Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339,343 (2006).
7. See Hearing Before the Commission on the Future of Indigent Def Servs. 377-78
(N.Y. 2005) (statement of Vincent Warren, Senior Staff Counsel, ACLU National Legal
Department), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/indigentdefense-commission/nyc_2-
11-05.pdf.
8. See Bill Rankin, Without a Lawyer, Indigent's Case Stalls, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan.
6, 2009, at C4 (discussing the most recent example of the state's public defense financial
crisis).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Judy Harrison, Indigent Defense Solutions Sought in Maine, BANGOR
DAILY NEWS, June 21, 2008, at BI (noting that state earned failing grade on nine out of ten
benchmarks that ABA uses to assess delivery of public defense services).
11. See, e.g., Malia Brink, Indigent Defense, CHAMPION, May 2007, at 10 (describing
fiscal crisis that forced chief defender in Mohave County to withdraw from almost one
hundred cases).
12. See David A. Simon, Equal Before the Law. Toward a Restoration of Gideon's
Promise, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 581,586 (2008).
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thread. Without adequate funding, states and counties cannot provide the
fundamental elements of an effective, efficient, high-quality, and ethical
public defense system. 3 Such elements include the ability of a state or
county to hire or train the appropriate number of defense attorneys,
competitively compensate their attorneys, supervise their attorneys and
ensure their compliance with ethical and performance standards, and arm
defense counsel with the requisite investigative and expert assistance. 4
Under these circumstances, even the most well-intentioned indigent
defense lawyer is hard-pressed to provide effective assistance.
Fiscal problems, in general, are legislative problems. 5 And yet, across
the country state legislatures have been on notice, sometimes for decades,
regarding their state's own indigent defense crisis without taking action. 6
Indigent defendants represent the archetypical "discrete and insular
minority,"'7 in that they lack a cohesive and effective voice in the political
process. People accused of crimes are often excluded from the electorate
because they tend to hail from poor and alienated groups, or have even
been barred from voting if convicted of a felony.' At the same time, the
people who do make up the general electorate often demand that
politicians take a "tough on crime" stance. 19 As a result, legislatures have
traditionally been unresponsive to the unpopular and largely silent
constituency of criminal defendants."0
13. See STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, ABA, THE TEN
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 8 (2002) [hereinafter THE TEN
PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/resolution
107.pdf.
14. These elements of a well-functioning indigent defense system are embodied in the
ABA's "The Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System." See id See also
discussion infra Part II.
15. See, e.g., La. Mun. Ass'n v. State, 893 So. 2d 809, 843 (La. 2005) ("The legislative
power includes 'absolute control over the finances of the state, except as limited by
constitutional provisions.' Moreover, 'it is the legislature that decides how the branches
and departments of government shall be funded from the public fisc."' (citation omitted)).
16. See discussion ifira Part II (discussing numerous suits filed against counties and
states for failing to provide adequate indigent defense services within past ten to fifteen
years because of lack of resources for indigent defense).
17. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
18. See Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of
Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219,254 (2004).
19. See Ronald J. Tabak, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and
Due Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure ?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 295-96
(1994) (describing several noteworthy instances where politicians succumbed to pressure to
be perceived as tough on crime).
20. See Wright, supra note 18, at 254 ("It is easy to find examples of legislatures that
refuse to increase (or even to maintain) funding for criminal defense work, and legislators
are none too subtle in explaining that the defense of accused criminals is a low funding
priority. . .. [L]egislators interested in their own political careers will see that those who
could benefit from government-funded defense lawyers -convicted criminals, accused
criminals, and those likely to be accused of crimes-probably cannot help them get re-
Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law
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In recent years, recognizing this political process problem, advocacy
groups have taken the indigent defense crisis to the courts.2 1 This article
evaluates that trend by examining recent attempts to use structural
litigation to improve indigent defense services. Historically, structural
litigation-which has been defined as "a sustained pattern of cases against
large power structures invoking the power of the courts to oversee detailed
injunctive relief" 2 2-has been sparingly used in the indigent defense
context. It is estimated that no more than ten of these suits were filed
between 1980 and 2000.23 Moreover, early suits seeking to improve
indigent defense failed to generate lasting reform.24
In the last ten to fifteen years, however, advocacy groups and private
lawyers working in a pro bono capacity have employed a new model of
structural litigation that has been more promising for defense advocates.
Suits in Pennsylvania and Connecticut prompted a consent decree and a
settlement, respectively, while suits in Montana and Massachusetts
generated new law regarding indigent defense requirements. Other
scholars have provided descriptive accounts of some of these suits, 26 and
this article takes those descriptive accounts as its point of departure.
Specifically, this article provides a detailed template for indigent defense
structural litigation, while also flagging additional strategies that future
litigants need to explore.
This article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I offer a brief overview
of what I call the "first-generation" suits seeking systemic reform of
elected."). Although Wright discusses the difficulties of legislative advocacy on behalf of
indigent defense, he does offer some reasons to pursue defense resource parity despite this
traditional legislative reluctance to allocate defense funds.
21. See discussion infra Part I.
22. Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434,
437 (2007). See also JOHN C. JEFFRIES, PAMELA S. KARLAN, PETER W. Low & GEORGE A.
RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION 848 (2000) (noting
that suits brought as class actions, typically seeking injunctive relief and reform of
government operations, "have come to be known as 'structural reform,' or 'institutional' or
'public law' litigation").
23. Gideon 's Promise Unfulfilled- The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent
Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2074 n.93 (2000) [hereinafter Gideon's Promise
Unfulfilleal.
24. See discussion infra Part I.
25. See discussion infra Part II.
26. See, e.g., Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What Courts Can Do to Improve the
Delivery of Criminal Defense Services, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 293 (2002); Rodger Citron,
(Un)Luckey v. Miller: The Case for a Structural Injunction to Improve Indigent Defense
Services, 101 YALE L.J. 481 (1991); Effectively Ineffective. The Failure of Courts to
Address Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (2005)
[hereinafter Effectively Ineffective]; Vidhya K. Reddy, Indigent Defense Reform: The Role
of Systemic Litigation in Operationalizing the Gideon Right to Counsel (Wash. Univ. Sch.
of Law, Working Paper No. 1279185, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1279185.
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indigent defense. 27 These first-generation suits were a mixed bag. Some
courts were solicitous of the idea that courts had the inherent authority to
regulate the administration of justice through effective counsel, while
other courts rejected these claims outright and punted on systemic
deficiencies. 28 In Part 11, 1 describe the suits that I refer to as "second-
generation" suits, with an eye toward delineating what has made these
suits different and more successful than their predecessors. In Part III, I
argue that this new model of litigation can be replicated elsewhere, and I
identify jurisdictions ripe for litigated reform. In addition, I suggest
several issues for future litigants to consider, including the pursuit of a
federal forum. Finally, I offer several specific strategies that individual
defense attorneys can pursue to spur systemic reform when litigation is not
on the horizon.
I.
STRUCTURAL LITIGATION OF INDIGENT DEFENSE: FIRST-GENERATION
SUITS
In this section of the article, I provide a brief overview of the first-
generation suits that challenged indigent defense systems, noting the
reasons for their failures. Other authors have described some of these
suits in detail,29 and I address them here purely for context. Despite the
prevalence of structural litigation to address a panoply of social ills, ° early
indigent defense advocates rarely employed structural litigation,31 and
when they did, courts did not know what to do with these first-generation
suits. Historically, courts have considered Sixth Amendment challenges to
the quality of indigent defense counsel in the context of petitioners' post-
conviction review.32 In that setting, courts apply the test for ineffective
27. My demarcation of first- and second-generation suits is largely chronological.
First-generation suits were, for the most part, brought in the 1980s and early 1990s, while
second-generation suits were brought in the mid-1990s and continue to the present.
However, there are some outliers. For example, a very recent systemic suit challenging
indigent defense in Mississippi failed. See discussion infra Part II. At the same time, the
first- and second-generation descriptive is also a phenomenological qualifier. As I describe
in Parts I and II, infra, first-generation suits were reactive and sought limited judicial relief,
while second-generation suits have been proactive and have sought sweeping reform.
28. See discussion infra Part I.
29. See sources cited supra note 26.
30. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1284 (1976) (citing public law litigation in realms of school desegregation,
employment discrimination, prisoners' or inmates' rights, antitrust, securities fraud,
consumer fraud, housing discrimination, electoral reapportionment, and environmental
management). See generally Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights:
How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004) (providing a more
modern account of this type of litigation and defending its efficacy).
31. See Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 23.
32. See Citron, supra note 26, at 486-87.
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assistance of counsel that comes from the Supreme Court's decision in
Strickland v. Washington.33 The Strickland test requires a defendant to
demonstrate (1) that her counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that
the counsel's deficiency prejudiced the outcome of the defendant's case.34
The Strickland test sets an incredibly high standard for defendants to
meet.35 Moreover, it is not an appropriate mechanism for raising systemic
claims; by definition it focuses a court's attention on the experience of one
client with one lawyer.
First-generation suits generally fall into two subcategories: (1)
challenges to public defense systems that arose in the context of an
individual criminal prosecution and (2) class actions brought to challenge
state and county defense systems. With respect to the first subcategory,
two patterns emerge. Some courts rejected outright the idea that a
defendant could raise the claim of a system-wide indigent defense crisis in
the context of an individual case. Others were more open to the claim on
theoretical grounds, but the relief they afforded did not create sustainable
reform within the indigent defense system.
A. Challenges in the Context of an Individual Case
Early attempts to reform state or county defense systems on Sixth
Amendment grounds often arose in the context of an ongoing, individual
criminal prosecution.36 The typical scenario entailed a defendant seeking
33. See id, at 486-88 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
34. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
35. See Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys.
A System in Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1, 19 ("First, the Strickland court
encourages reviewing courts not to speak of incompetent legal representation in many
situations, thereby eliminating an opportunity for courts to discuss and put defense lawyers
on notice regarding unacceptable lawyering activities. Second, the Court set in place strong
presumptions that unnecessarily favor poor lawyering conduct. Further, as a result of
Strickland, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is essentially rendered a viable claim
available only to the truly innocent criminal defendant. Finally, a Strickland challenge
requires the cooperation of the attorney about whom the petitioner complains. Any one of
these reasons individually makes bringing a successful ineffective assistance of counsel
claim-even where one received deplorable legal assistance-an arduous task. Taken
together, they make Strickland challenges exceedingly difficult to win." (citations
omitted)); William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland 's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical
Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 165 (1995) ("The
Strickland standard is a farce, but its replacement should be realistic. With the help of
competent practitioners, the organized profession could put an alternative to Strickland on
the table for consideration by the courts or legislatures."); Bruce A. Green, LethalFiction:
The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IowA L. REV. 433, 499-507 (1993)
(arguing that while the Strickland standard is indeed flawed, the solution lies in a stricter
definition of competent counsel rather than a revamped standard).
36. This article focuses on litigation that seeks to vindicate the interests of the indigent
defendant. Other scholars have noted, however, that even before systemic suits were
brought on Sixth Amendment grounds, lawyers brought suits to vindicate their own right to
adequate compensation based on the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. See, e.g., Backus
Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law
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dismissal of the charges against her or reversal of a conviction based on
systemic failures of the public defense system. Alternatively, indigent
defense lawyers occasionally challenged a public defense system, arguing
that its fee caps or rates of compensation were so low that they either
resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel or unconstitutional conflicts of
interest. For the most part, state court judges were readily able to dismiss
these claims, shunting them into either the appellate or political process.
In Ex parte Grayson, the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether Alabama's compensation of counsel statute denied
Grayson, a defendant convicted of capital murder, due process and equal
protection of the laws.37 At the time, Alabama's compensation of counsel
statute allowed a maximum of $1000 for the representation of an indigent
defendant-even a capital one.38  Grayson argued on appeal that the
statutory ceiling prevented him from receiving effective assistance of
counsel, and the Supreme Court of Alabama, affirming the court of
appeals, rejected the contention outright:
Petitioner bases [his] claim on the dubious ground that $1000 is
enough compensation for defense of non-capital cases, but is
insufficient compensation for a capital defense and, therefore, that
a capital defendant will not have as effective assistance of counsel
as non-capital defendants have. These contentions are made on
the premise that lawyers will not provide effective assistance
unless paid a certain amount of money. But the legal profession
requires its members to give their best efforts in "advancing the
'undivided interests of [their] client[s]."'... We reaffirm this
belief that attorneys appointed to defend capital clients will serve
them well, as directed by their consciences and the ethical rules
enforced by the state bar association. The counsel compensation
statute, then, does not deprive petitioner of due process and equal
protection of the laws.39
While Alabama has increased somewhat its statutory rate of
compensation since Grayson,4" its courts have continued to reject facial
& Marcus, supra note 1, at 1116 (describing the "takings" cases as the first wave of
litigation seeking remedies for problems plaguing indigent defense systems); Bernhard,
supra note 26, at 313-15 (describing several state court "takings" cases); Reddy, supra note
26, at 10-15 (discussing this litigation and the groundwork it laid for future Sixth
Amendment litigation).
37. Exparte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 79 (Ala. 1985).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 79-80 (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted).
40. See ALA. CODE § 15-12-21 (Supp. 2008). Effective October 1, 2000, the in-court
and out-of-court hourly rates of compensation for court-appointed counsel went from fifty
dollars and thirty dollars, respectively, to sixty dollars and forty dollars. At the same time,
the statute now imposes no cap on appointed counsel in a capital case, but it does cap the
fees for appointed counsel in a Class A felony case at $3500.
Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law
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attacks to the indigent defense system based on claims of inadequate
attorney compensation.4
As recently as 2000, in Webb v. Commonwealth, a Virginia court of
appeals took a similar stance when faced with a constitutional challenge to
the state's statutory cap on attorneys' fees.42 In 1997 Webb and a
codefendant robbed a restaurant and Webb's codefendant shot and killed
the restaurant manager.43  As an indigent defendant, Webb was
represented by court-appointed counsel.' Prior to Webb's robbery and
murder trial, his counsel moved to dismiss the charges against his client,
arguing that the Virginia statute governing fees for indigent defense
counsel was unconstitutional on its face and as it applied to Webb.45
Webb's counsel presented the court with impressive evidence to
support his claim that the scheme both created a financial disincentive for
zealous advocacy and was unconstitutional. At the time that Webb's
lawyer raised this challenge, Virginia law capped the fees for court-
appointed attorneys at $735 for felony cases where the defendant faced
more than twenty years in prison and $265 for all other felony cases.46
Webb's counsel also argued that court-appointed attorneys were
potentially operating under a conflict of interest: as a result of low fees,
court-appointed attorneys for indigent defendants were forced to choose
between "not being adequately compensated or not adequately
representing [their] client[s]. '47 Webb's counsel also demonstrated to the
41. See Gaddy v. State, 952 So. 2d 1149, 1164-65 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (rejecting
defendant's claim that his counsel had been ineffective "because of the grossly inadequate
compensation set out in Alabama's indigent defense statute"). Note also that Alabama is
not unique in its rejection of facial attacks to aspects of indigent defense systems. See, e.g.,
Hillsborough County v. Unterberger, 534 So. 2d 838, 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(denying a challenge to statutory process for setting indigent defense attorney
compensation rate); State v. See, 387 N.W.2d 583, 584-87 (Iowa 1986) (rejecting challenge
to process for determining appointed attorney's fees); State v. Keener, 577 P.2d 1182, 1185
(Kan. 1978) (denying a due process challenge to public defense scheme that required
repayment from defendant).
42. See Webb v. Commonwealth, 528 S.E.2d 138, 145 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
43. Id. at 140.
44. Id. It is worth noting that Webb's appointed counsel, Steven D. Benjamin, is a
highly acclaimed criminal defense attorney and that, in some sense, his very competence
may have hampered Webb's assertion that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel.
For a biography of Benjamin, see National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
Steven D. Benjamin, http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/Leadership/Steven+D.+Benjamin?
OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 7, 2009). To some extent, this paradox provides an
additional explanation for the failure of first-generation suits: to the extent that they were
mounted by exceptional defense counsel, some defense counsel were arguing a theoretical
conflict of interest created by exceptionally low attorney fee compensation rather than an
actual conflict of interest experienced by the attorney in that particular case.
45. Webb, 528 S.E.2d at 140.
46. Id. at 141 n.1.
47. Id. at 142. For instance, at the time Webb's counsel filed the motion to dismiss, he
had already expended more than ninety hours working on the case, thirty hours more than
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court that, at the time, Virginia "ranked fifty-first amongst the states and
the District of Columbia for allowable compensation for court-appointed
attorneys and that the disparity between Virginia and the other states
[was] overwhelming."4 8  Finally, Webb's attorney argued that because
Virginia's indigent defense fees were so low and inflexible, the statutory
scheme at issue violated Webb's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his
due process rights.49
The court of appeals took notice of the fact that the state ranked dead
last in fees for indigent defense counsel. The court also recognized that
Webb's counsel had spent ninety hours preparing for trial. Under the
statute in place at the time, Webb's counsel could earn no more than $735;
ninety hours of work would generate an hourly fee of approximately eight
dollars °.5  Despite its own acceptance of these facts, the court rejected all
arguments that the statutory scheme was unconstitutional or that it created
a financial disincentive for Webb's lawyer to provide adequate
representation.
Reasoning that, in this case, Webb's lawyer had prepared an effective
representation-even at great personal financial loss-the court saw no
basis for the conflict of interest claim. 1 Moreover, the court rejected a
facial attack to the statutory scheme, holding: "To the extent Webb claims
that the statutory caps for court-appointed counsel fees for indigent
defendants are woefully inadequate, redress must come from the General
Assembly. On this record, we do not find that the fee schedule is so
inadequate as to violate the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments., 52 Thus,
Webb and Grayson demonstrate great judicial reluctance to assume
responsibility for systemic reform of indigent defense-or to even
acknowledge systemic shortcomings, such as chronic underfunding
the time for which compensation was allowed under the statute. Id. at 140.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 143.
50. Id. at 140 n.1.
51. Id. at 142 ("Although [Webb's attorney] made a bare claim that this situation
creates a potential conflict of interest because an attorney must choose between not being
adequately compensated or not adequately representing his client, [his attorney] neither
alleged nor presented evidence that he labored under an actual conflict of interest.
Understandably, he did not allege that he was unable or unwilling to zealously represent
Webb because of financial constraints or considerations."). In fact, the conflict of interest
claims that were raised in Webb have persistently failed. See, e.g., Britt v. State, 653 S.E.2d
713 (Ga. 2007) (affirming contempt citation for two attorneys who refused to continue
representing their indigent client based on the argument that it would be an ethical
violation given the compensation scheme at issue and the conflict of interest that it
created).
52. Webb, 528 S.E.2d at 145.
53. One would hope that, today, a decision like Webb in Virginia is less likely. In
2006, Virginia narrowly avoided a lawsuit prepared by lawyers from Covington & Burling
LLP, along with support from the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the
Virginia Indigent Defense Coalition, and the American Bar Association, when the state
Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law
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Not all state court judges have been hostile to these types of claims.
For example, some state court judges have recognized that the competence
of attorneys representing indigent defendants is within the realm of
judicial authority, and on that basis, courts have refused to be bound by a
predetermined fee cap for indigent defense services.54 Moreover, in three
noteworthy cases-State v. Peart, State v. Lynch, and State v. Smith-state
court judges took the initiative to address systemic flaws in the context of
individual criminal cases."
In State v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of Mohave County's bid system for providing counsel to
indigent defendants. 6 Under that system, the county solicited sealed bids
from practicing attorneys for the representation of indigent defendants;
historically the county selected the lowest bids to provide indigent
representation.5 ' The Arizona Supreme Court held that the county's bid
system violated prevailing professional standards on four counts:
1. The system does not take into account the time that the
attorney is expected to spend in representing his share of indigent
defendants.
2. The system does not provide for support costs for the attorney,
such as investigators, paralegals, and law clerks.
3. The system fails to take into account the competency of the
attorney. An attorney, especially one newly-admitted to the bar,
for example, could bid low in order to obtain a contract, but would
not be able to adequately represent all of the clients assigned
agreed to undertake widespread reform of its indigent defense system. See Malia Brink,
Indigent Defense Reform in Virginia: A Long Road Well-Traveled, CHAMPION, May 2007,
at 10-19 (chronicling the history of the suit and subsequent legislative changes). The suit
was designed to challenge the state's then "hard-cap" defense system under which defense
attorneys were paid a predetermined amount depending upon the severity of the crime and
judges had no latitude to adjust the caps. As a result of legislation passed by the Virginia
Legislature in 2007, judges can now waive the fee caps upon a showing of good cause. Id. at
18-19.
54. See, e.g., Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 1986) (finding
fee-cap statute unconstitutional as applied because it curtailed inherent judicial authority to
ensure adequate representation); Smith v. State, 394 A.2d 834, 839 (N.H. 1978) ("Since the
obligation to represent indigent defendants is an obligation springing from judicial
authority, so too is the determination of reasonable compensation for court-appointed
attorneys a matter for judicial determination. The power to regulate officers of the court is
a power inherent in the judicial branch. Implicit in that power is the authority to fix
reasonable compensation rates for court-appointed attorneys.").
55. See Effectively Ineffective, supra note 26, at 1735-41 (discussing State v. Lynch,
State v. Smith, and State v. Peart as three cases that contributed to indigent defense funding
reforms).
56. State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984).
57. Id, at 1379.
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according to the standard of Watson.58
4. The system does not take into account the complexity of each
case.
59
Moreover, the state supreme court announced that "if the same
procedure for selection and compensation of counsel is followed as was
followed in this case, there will be an inference that the procedure resulted
in ineffective assistance of counsel, which inference the state will have the
burden of rebutting.,
60
The Louisiana and Oklahoma Supreme Courts were similarly
responsive to challenges to indigent defense systems in the cases of State v.
Peart' and State v. Lynch. 62 In Peart, at issue was the constitutionality of
New Orleans' public defense system. Peart's counsel had requested relief
from the trial court, arguing that because the New Orleans system was so
underfunded, he was operating under a workload that deprived his clients
of effective representation.63 The Louisiana Supreme Court declined to
find the system unconstitutional, but it did declare "because of the
excessive caseloads and the insufficient support with which their attorneys
must work, indigent defendants in [New Orleans] are generally not
provided with the effective assistance of counsel the constitution
requires."' To remedy the situation, the court announced a rebuttable
presumption, similar to that in Smith, "that indigents.., are receiving
assistance of counsel not sufficiently effective to meet constitutionally
required standards."65
In Lynch, when two court-appointed indigent defense counsel
challenged statutory fee caps, the Oklahoma Supreme Court took
jurisdiction over the issue of funding indigent defense and set guidelines
for compensation of counsel until the legislature acted to do so.66 The
Court cited its "constitutional responsibilities relating to the managerial
and superintending control of the district courts and of the practice of law"
and "the inherent power of [the] court to define and regulate the practice
of law" as the bases of its authority to act.67 Moreover, it noted that while
"the provision of counsel for indigent defendants, and the compensation of
58. The Watson standard for judging a lawyer's competency is "whether under the
circumstances the attorney showed at least minimal competence in representing the
criminal defendant." State v. Watson, 653 P.2d 351, 354 (Ariz. 1982).
59. Smith, 681 P.2d at 1381.
60. Id. at 1384.
61. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993).
62. State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990).
63. Peart, 621 So. 2d at 784.
64. Id. at 790.
65. Id at 791.
66. Lynch, 796 P.2d at 1163.
67. Id.
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such counsel also lie within the Legislative sphere," until the legislature
took up the issues, the court had a responsibility to address the
constitutional claims of the indigent defendants and their lawyers.6"
Unfortunately, the relief afforded in Smith, Lynch, and Peart has not
been sustained.6 9 Louisiana appellate courts have continued to require
individual showings of ineffective assistance of counsel, despite Pearfs
establishment of a rebuttable presumption of inefficacy.7" In 2007, one
New Orleans judge announced he would release inmates and refuse to
assign further cases to public defenders based on the system's
unconstitutional nature.71 In his order, he described the system as follows:
"Indigent defense in New Orleans is unbelievable, unconstitutional, totally
lacking in the basic professional standards of legal representation and a
mockery of what criminal justice should be in a Western civilized nation.
7 2
Similarly, despite the calls to action in Smith and Lynch, Oklahoma and
Arizona continue to grapple with indigent defense funding issues.7 3 In
each of the three states, unsupportive legislatures, subsequent state judges,
or both have eviscerated the state supreme court's initial attempt to
improve the public defense system.
Thus, first-generation suits brought in the context of individual cases
were either rejected outright by courts or resulted in fleeting relief.
B. Systemic Challenges
There are a few first-generation systemic challenges that did not arise
purely in individual defendants' cases. Rather, these suits looked more
like what one thinks of when one envisions impact litigation-a proactive,
68. Id at 1164.
69. Effectively Ineffective, supra note 26, at 1735-41 (noting that Peart has been an
ineffective mechanism for criminal defendants to obtain relief for ineffective assistance of
counsel and did not sustain legislative increases in funding; that since Lynch, the Oklahoma
Indigent Defense System has experienced repeated financial crises; and that after Smith the
Mohave County defense system experienced tremendous financial strain and
unmanageable caseloads). See also Backus & Marcus, supra note 1, at 1117-21 (discussing
the failure of the same three cases to generate lasting reform).
70. See Effectively Ineffective, supra note 26, at 1737. See also State v. Paben, 990 So.
2d 123, 125-26 (La. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Smith, 988 So. 2d 861, 868-69 (La. Ct. App.
2008); State v. Carter, 987 So. 2d 364, 372-74 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
71. Laura Parker, New Orleans Judge May Free Dozens, USA TODAY, Apr. 2, 2007, at
A3.
72. Id
73. See Effectively Ineffective, supra note 26, at 1737-40. See also Yvonne Wingett &
Michael Kiefer, County Faces Rising Cost of Justice, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Aug. 12, 2007, at
Al; Robert Boczkiewicz, Death Row Inmates' Attorneys Receive Victory, NEwsOK.coM,
Jan. 24, 2006 (describing availability of federal funds for state clemency proceedings where
state funds were inadequate), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/
Oklahoma0O1; infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text (describing ongoing low rates of
compensation for indigent defense counsel in Oklahoma counties).
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organized suit aimed at generating systemic reform.74 These suits comprise
a second subcategory of what I refer to as first-generation suits, and there
are a handful to consider in both state and federal court.
In Kennedy v. Carlson, the chief public defender in Minneapolis filed
a lawsuit arguing that the state's public defense system deprived his clients
of their Sixth Amendment right to counselY.7  The court described
Kennedy's claim as follows:
[H]is clients have been exposed to the possibility of substandard
legal representation due to excessive public defender
caseloads.... Public defenders cannot refuse to accept new
clients under Minnesota law; therefore, Kennedy's attorneys must
"plead out" two to four cases each day, making it impossible to
spend sufficient time with each individual client. As a result of his
office's heavy workload, Kennedy argues that his clients' Sixth
Amendment right to effective legal assistance may or will be
violated .... 76
Despite the systemic underfunding and excessive caseload problems
that Kennedy sought to correct, the court found the cases nonjusticiable
because the plaintiffs failed to put on "evidence that ... clients actually
have been prejudiced due to ineffective assistance of counsel., 77  The
Kennedy court recognized that state judges had afforded relief in similar
cases before, citing Peart and Smith, but distinguished those cases as ones
where the plaintiffs had demonstrated actual harm to the indigent
defendant clients.8 Consequently, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
rejected Kennedy's constitutional challenge as "too speculative and
hypothetical to support jurisdiction.
79
Federal courts, for the most part, have been unavailable to litigants
seeking systemic reform of indigent defense.8" Perhaps the most well-
74. See JEFFRIES, KARLAN, Low & RUTHERGLEN, supra note 22, at 848-49 (2000)
(distinguishing structural reform litigation from a traditional lawsuit).
75. Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1996).
76. Id, at 6.
77. Id. at 7. The court cited instead to evidence establishing that the defender office
was well respected by trial judges, that it was well funded when compared to other public
defender offices, and that its attorneys faced no claims of professional misconduct or
malpractice. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 8. See also Platt v. State, 664 N.E.2d 357, 363 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)
(coming to similar conclusions and citing Kennedy).
80. See Bernhard, supra note 26, at 332 ("Federal courts have been prevented largely
from engaging in the reform of state indigent defense systems .... "); Gideon ' Promise
Unfulfilled, supra note 23, at 2077 ("A serious obstacle to the future viability of litigated
reform ... is the lack of a federal forum to hear such claims."). But see Gilliard v. Carson,
348 F. Supp. 757 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (providing declaratory and injunctive relief to class of
indigent defendants); Consent Order at 1-2, Stinson v. Fulton County Bd. of Comm'rs, No.
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known example of federal public litigation regarding indigent defense is
the Eleventh Circuit case of Luckey v. Miller, in which the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) sought judicial overhaul of Georgia's county-
based system for indigent defense."s Citing Younger v. Harris, in which the
Supreme Court held that federal courts should not interfere with ongoing
state criminal prosecutions,' the district court in Luckey held that the
relief plaintiffs had requested would likely require intensive federal
judicial oversight of state prosecutions, and that such an outcome was
barred by Younger.3 In an earlier proceeding, the Eleventh Circuit
recognized the theoretical possibility that a defendant could seek to
vindicate her Sixth Amendment rights outside the context of Strickland,'
but at the same time, the court ultimately affirmed dismissal on abstention
grounds.85 The Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have followed suit when
similar claims have been filed. 6
Despite the unavailability of a federal forum for these claims to date, it
is worth noting that Luckey did create some good law for indigent defense
advocates going forward. Importantly, Luckey recognized that a
defendant has the right to make a Sixth Amendment challenge outside the
context of post-conviction review, reasoning that the right to counsel is
1-94-CV-240-GET (N.D. Ga. 1999) (implementing order mandating Fulton County to
achieve certain goals in regards to affording defendants with effective and continuous legal
representation). I discuss the basis upon which parties could seek a federal forum in Part
III, infra.
81. Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992).
82. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
83. Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d at 677-79.
84. See Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1988) ("[The Stricklani
standard is inappropriate for a civil suit seeking prospective relief. The sixth amendment
protects rights that do not affect the outcome of a trial. Thus, deficiencies that do not meet
the 'ineffectiveness' standard may nonetheless violate a defendant's rights under the sixth
amendment. In the post-trial context, such errors may be deemed harmless because they
did not affect the outcome of the trial. Whether an accused has been prejudiced by the
denial of a right is an issue that relates to relief-whether the defendant is entitled to have
his or her conviction overturned -rather than to the question of whether such a right exists
and can be protected prospectively.")
85. Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d at 678 ("'[T]he relief sought by the plaintiffs would
require this Court to force the state to promulgate uniform standards relating to various
stages of prosecutions and also to monitor those standards. If the monitoring is to be
effective, this Court will have to review ongoing state proceedings and may have to
interrupt them if the standards are not being followed. Even if the Court merely required
periodic reporting, such action on the part of a federal court strikes at the heart of the
prohibitions that are embedded into constitutional law by Younger and its progeny.'
(quoting the district court decision)). See also discussion infra Part III.A.2 (providing a
general overview of abstention doctrine issues in the context of public defense litigation).
86. See Foster v. Kassulke, 898 F.2d 1144 (6th Cir. 1990) (rejecting inmate's challenge
to Kentucky public defense system); Gardner v. Luckey, 500 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1974)
(rejecting class action challenging Florida public defense system); Wallace v. Kern, 499 F.2d
1345 (2d Cir. 1974) (rejecting class action by inmates to enforce their right to a speedy
trial).
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more than the right to a certain result."s This part of the Luckey decision
could be used as leverage by advocates attempting to litigate these claims
in federal court, as I discuss, infra, in Part III.
These cases provide a flavor of the first-generation suits that sought
systemic reform of indigent defense. Some of these suits were brought as
defenses to individual prosecutions, while others, in both state and federal
court, were externally driven, organized attempts to create new law
regarding public defense systems. These first-generation suits were small
in number, and they were generally ineffective at generating lasting results.
Several factors explain the inefficacy of these suits.
First, with respect to Grayson and Webb, these cases demonstrate
that, unfortunately, in some states, judges have simply been hostile to the
idea that indigent defense requires more funding and oversight from the
state."8 Alabama and Virginia both have poor track records when it comes
to protecting the rights of criminal defendants,89 and the language of these
decisions reveals that history. The Grayson court's declaration of its
"belief that attorneys appointed to defend capital clients will serve them
well, as directed by their consciences and the ethical rules,"9 ° was
disingenuous at the time. Only three years after the Grayson decision, an
independent report on Alabama's indigent defense system found that
"there was simply not enough money to meet the demands of the...
system on a yearly basis" and that "the statutorily created reimbursement
rates for appointed counsel were so low that competent attorneys had been
steadily driven out of the system of representing indigent defendants."9
Surely, the Alabama bench was aware of the poor quality of defense
advocacy in its courtrooms; the will to change was simply not there.
In some cases, the courts' rejection of requests for systemic relief may
be attributed to judicial hostility. After losing his constitutional challenge
to the system in Webb, Webb's lawyer, Steven Benjamin, continued to
make the claim that the state's astonishingly low fee caps created a conflict
87. See Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d at 1017-18 ("[The Strickland] standard is
inappropriate for a civil suit seeking prospective relief. The sixth amendment protects
rights that do not affect the outcome of a trial. Thus, deficiencies that do not meet the
'ineffectiveness' standard may nonetheless violate a defendant's rights under the sixth
amendment."). See also Citron, supra note 26, at 492-94; Reddy, supra note 26, at 18.
88. See supra notes 37-53 and accompanying text.
89. See STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, ABA,
"ALABAMA" INFORMATION SHEET 2 (2004) (citing the "attitude of the judiciary" as a
"significant impediment to indigent defense reform in Alabama"), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/downloads/al.pdf;
Brink, supra note 53, at 11 (noting that the hard-cap compensation for public defense
counsel in Virginia had been in place and had been documented as a problem more than
thirty years before legislation improved matters in 2007).
90. Exparte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 80 (Ala. 1985).
91. David Allen Felice, Justice Rationed: A Look at Alabama's Present Indigent
Defense System with a Vision Towards Change, 52 ALA. L. REV. 975, 986-87 (2001).
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of interest for court-appointed attorneys.92  In one instance where
Benjamin raised this issue, the presiding judge "responded by ordering
Benjamin removed from the case," until Benjamin's client begged to have
him reinstated.93 Another judge, having heard about Benjamin's conflict
of interest challenge, announced that he would remove attorneys who
brought similar challenges from the roster of indigent defense counsel. 94
But judicial insensitivity alone does not explain the shortcomings of
these first-generation suits. Indeed, these suits also shared some strategic
weaknesses. With respect to the suits brought in the context of an
individual prosecution, they "focus[ed] retrospectively on individual cases
rather than looking prospectively to demand reform of the system as a
whole." 95 Accordingly, they were not a good vehicle for systemic reform.
Moreover, in Smith and Lynch, defense counsel challenged an individual
defendant's conviction and the defense counsel's compensation,
respectively, in individual cases.96 Given the procedural posture of both
cases, defense counsel in neither case asked for a court order regarding
additional defense funding or long-term oversight.97 Finally, and perhaps
most critically, as the Kennedy case demonstrates, a lack of data
demonstrating actual harm to clients undermined the plaintiffs' claims that
there were widespread violations of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 98
Thus, for a host of reasons, first-generation challenges to indigent
defense systems were not fruitful for the most part. In some cases these
suits were dismissed, while in other cases, they resulted in only short-term
remedies. The next section of this article turns to more recent and more
empirically grounded suits-what I call second-generation suits-and
identifies the reasons for their comparative success.
II.
SECOND-GENERATION SUITS
In the last ten to fifteen years, defender organizations, nonprofit
organizations, and private lawyers working in a pro bono capacity have
pursued indigent defense reform through systemic lawsuits in several states
and counties across the country. 99 One may say that there is now a new
92. Brink, supra note 53, at 12.
93. Id.
94. Id
95. Effectively Ineffective, supra note 26, at 1742.
96. See supra notes 56-60, 66-68 and accompanying text
97. Id.
98. See Kennedy v. Carbon, 544 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 1996); supra note 77 and
accompanying text.
99. It is fair to say that the ACLU is driving this trend of impact litigation to improve
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model for systemic litigation of indigent defense embodied in these
lawsuits.1" While these suits have not been perfect,"0 ' they have been far
better prepared and executed than their predecessor suits, and, in some
instances, they have created substantive, lasting reform. In this section of
the article I first review several second-generation lawsuits to provide an
overview of recent and ongoing litigation. Next, I identify what I view as
the salient elements of these second-generation suits, with an eye toward
creating a template that other advocacy groups can replicate going
forward.
A. The Second-Generation Suit. An Overview of Litigation
What do these second-generation suits look like? Unlike first-
generation challenges to indigent defense systems, these suits are not
merely aggregated ineffective assistance of counsel claims.1°2  Instead,
these suits are primarily state-court class actions, challenging objective
criteria, such as excessive attorney caseloads, meager rates of attorney
public defense systems, though the organization is certainly not alone in bringing such suits.
I am grateful to the many ACLU attorneys and the attorneys with whom the organization
has collaborated on these suits who took the time to speak with me about this litigation,
including Robin Dahlberg, Corey Stoughton, Scott Crichton, Vic Walczak, David Carroll of
the NLADA, Bob Spangenberg of the Spangenberg Group, and the Honorable Judge
Karla Grey.
100. Other scholars have previously sketched out necessary attributes to these
systematic litigation suits. See Bernhard, supra note 26, at 322 (describing attributes of
such suits as "egregious conditions (in other words-a real crisis), allegations of actual
injury to clients, litigation support from a law reform organization or bar association, and
public favor"); Nicole J. DeSario, The Quality of Indigent Defense on the 40th Anniversary
of Gideon: The Hamilton County Experience, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 43, 62 (describing "four
critical decisions" litigants of these suits must make as where to file, who to sue, who to
name as plaintiffs and what to use as evidence). The model I describe herein builds upon
these earlier ideas, but offers greater depth and additional elements to the model, largely in
light of practitioner interviews and more recent suits.
101. See discussion infra Part III.
102. See generally Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895
(Mass. 2004); Class Action Complaint, Rivera v. Rowland, 1998 WL 96407 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Feb. 20, 1998) (No. CV 950545629S) [hereinafter Rivera Complaint]; Complaint,
Duncan v. State, 2009 WL 1640975 (Mich. Cir. Ct. June 11, 2009) (Nos. 278652, 278858,
278860) [hereinafter Duncan Complaint]; Amended Complaint, White v. Martz, No. C DV-
2002-133 (Mont. Jud. Dist. Ct. Apr. 1, 2002) [hereinafter White Complaint]; Class Action
Complaint, Hurrell-Harring v. State, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349 (App. Div. 2009) (No. 8866-07)
[hereinafter Hurrell-Haring Complaint]; Third Amended Class Action Complaint, Doyle
v. Allegheny County Salary Bd., No. GD-96-13606 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Nov. 21, 1997) [hereinafter
Doyle Complaint]; Complaint, Best v. Grant County, No. 04-2-00189-0 (Wash. Sup. Ct.
2004). One may query my decision to include a 1995 and a 1997 case in the category of
second-generation suits. The categorization is only partly chronological;
phenomenologically, these two suits fit within this second-generation category. In addition,
these earlier second-generation suits, while not as ambitious and streamlined as, say, the
Hurrell-Harring class action suit pending in New York state today, proved something
essential-that systemic challenges to public defense systems could be brought and won.
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compensation, a lack of attorney hiring and training criteria, and the
absence of an oversight mechanism.
In the 1995 case Rivera v. Rowland, the ACLU and the Connecticut
Civil Liberties Union brought suit against Connecticut's Governor John G.
Rowland, alleging that the legislature's failure to adequately fund the
state's indigent defense system was a violation of its clients' Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.1"3  Specifically, the suit challenged
excessive attorney caseloads, substandard rates of compensation for
attorneys, and a lack of adequate representation for juvenile defendants.1"
After four and a half years of litigation, the law reform organizations
were able to bring about a settlement that has offered sustainable
improvements to the system. As a result of the settlement, the statewide
public defender office saw "a substantial (more than 30%) increase in
public defender staffing, and a commensurate reduction in public defender
caseloads, along with new practice and caseload guidelines, new training
programs and an oversight system for the private 'special' public defenders
that complement regular public defender staff."' 5
The ACLU described the settlement of Rivera v. Rowland as "a
model for reform of indigent defense systems around the country." 106 And
indeed that has been the case. In the wake of Rivera, the ACLU, in
collaboration with other defender organizations and private attorneys, has
filed similar suits in Pennsylvania, Montana, Massachusetts, and
Washington.7 Today, similar suits are pending in Michigan and New
York. l08
For the most part, these suits have been far more successful than their
predecessors. The Pennsylvania suit resulted in a consent decree, x°9 while
103. See Rivera Complaint, supra note 102, at 2. See also Reddy, supra note 26, at 30-
32 (describing suit and process that led to ACLU's withdrawal of suit).
104. Rivera Complaint, supra note 102, at 15-17. See also Reddy, supra note 26, at 30-
32.
105. ACLU, Legal Docket Highlights (2001), http://www.acluct.org/legal/20011egal
docket.htm.
106. Id.
107. See Reddy, supra note 26, at 24-25 (mentioning indigent defense funding suit
filed in Pennsylvania by ACLU in conjunction with private attorney). See also supra note
102 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text. A similar suit was filed in
Kentucky. See Brandon Ortiz, Public Defenders Sue State, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER,
July 1, 2008, at Al (reporting that the Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy filed suit
against state because of inadequacies in criminal defense system due to budget cuts).
However, it was later dismissed as moot, in light of additional funding that the Governor
made available to the public defense system. Lewis v. Hollenbach, No. 2009-SC-000164-TG
(Ky. dismissed as moot May 13, 2009).
109. See Reddy, supra note 26, at 24-30 (describing resolution of suit and court's
continuing jurisdiction over case until 2005).
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the suits in Montana" and Massachusetts"'. actually created new law.
In the Massachusetts case, the plaintiffs were indigent criminal
defendants who had no attorneys to represent them due to the low rate of
attorney compensation authorized by statute. 112 They asked the Supreme
Judicial Court to declare that trial court judges could increase attorney
rates of pay.113 The court took jurisdiction and held that "the petitioners'
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel [was] not being honored,"
and that judicial guidance was required to remedy the chronic
unavailability of appointed counsel in the jurisdictions at issue.114 The
court held that "no defendant entitled to court-appointed counsel may be
required to wait more than forty-five days for counsel to file an
appearance," and that "an indigent defendant who is held in lieu of bail or
under an order of preventive detention may not be held for more than
seven days without counsel."" 5 Not only did the court's opinion declare
the state's practice an ongoing constitutional violation, but the time limits
placed on detainment of indigent defendants prompted the legislature to
act. The court's declaration also may have given lawmakers the political
cover necessary to pursue a potentially unpopular increase in defense
spending.
11 6
In Montana, plaintiffs were similarly situated indigent defendants.
They argued that the state's delegation to counties of its duty to provide
counsel to indigent defendants had resulted in grossly inadequate
representation.1 7  This lawsuit was successful in that it prompted
legislative action. First, in 2003, the legislature put together a package to
respond to the 2002 suit, but, according to plaintiffs' counsel, it was "too
little, too late."' 8 Soon thereafter, the Attorney General approached the
110. White Complaint, supra note 102.
111. Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895 (Mass. 2004).
112. Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 899-901 (noting that in a state with the lowest rates of
compensation in the nation, there was a void of staff attorneys in the public counsels' office
and a lack of certified bar advocates to whom to assign cases).
113. Id. at 900-01.
114. Id at 904-05.
115. Id at 911.
116. See Jeffrey R. Goodwin, Massachusetts' Struggle to Adhere to the Gideon
Mandate: Will the Lavallee Decision, Coupled with Legislative Reform, Finally Establish a
State Indigent Criminal Defense System That Is Constitutionally Sound?, 32 NEw ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 77, 100-01 (2006); discussion infra Part III.A.1 (regarding
"Post-litigation Efforts"). See also The Spangenberg Group, Major Reform Legislation
Passed in Massachusetts, http://www.spangenberggroup.com/news/MassReformLegislation.
html (last visited April 5, 2009). But see Adam M. Gershowitz, Raise the Proof- A Default
Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 CONN. L. REV. 85, 103 (2007) (noting that within one year
legislature reverted on funding priorities which suggests legislative pressure needs to be
sustained even after successful suit).
117. See White Complaint, supra note 102, at 3-4.
118. Telephone Interview with Scott Crichton, Executive Dir., Mont. Am. Civil
Liberties Union (Aug. 25, 2008).
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ACLU to craft a solution. This was a fortuitous development: the
Attorney General was able to appeal to the more conservative members of
the lawmaking body and convince them that a legislative solution was
preferable to a judicial one.119 In 2005, the state legislature enacted the
Montana Public Defender Act. 12' Although the Montana system is still
relatively new, it has already been cited as a model for other states. The
new model is widely viewed to have resulted in increased quality and
consistency of representation, greater access to counsel, and greater
compensation for defense counsel, among other things. 1'
The two systemic Sixth Amendment suits currently pending-in New
York122 and in Michigan-make claims similar to those advanced in the
Montana suit. Both suits argue that the state has abdicated its
constitutional responsibility to provide indigent defendants with effective
representation by delegating this duty to the counties. 13 While it is too
early to predict how these suits will be resolved, both have recently
survived motions to dismiss. In August 2008, Albany Supreme Court
Justice Eugene Devine rejected the state's arguments that the named
plaintiffs lacked standing and that the relief requested was a legislative
function. 24 Justice Devine wrote:
119. Id.
120. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1-201 to -216 (2009) (outlining state's obligation to
create a public defender office, as well as an appellate defender office, and authorizing the
chief public defender to hire deputy public defenders, support staff, and a training
coordinator).
121. See Zachary Franz, State's Public Defender Overhaul Earns Kudos, GREAT
FALLS TRIB., July 27, 2008, at lA.
122. In April 2009, while this systemic public defense lawsuit was pending in the New
York state courts, the New York legislature passed a law imposing caseload limits for
public defense attorneys in New York City. See John Eligon, State Law to Cap Public
Defenders' Caseloads, but Only in the City, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2009, at A19. Defense
reform advocates were optimistic that this legislative move suggested that statewide reform
would follow. Id, Promptly thereafter, in July 2009, a divided New York appellate court
dismissed the pending lawsuit. See Hurrell-Harring v. State, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349 (App. Div.
2009). See also Elizabeth Stull, Defender Suit Heading to New York Court of Appeals,
DAILY RECORD (Rochester, N.Y.), July 23, 2009. Rejecting the plaintiffs' request for
systemic relief, the appellate court explained: "In our view, any decisions to address
[systemic] 'deficiencies' should be made by the executive and legislative branches of
government, and not by the Judiciary." Hurrell-Harring, 883 NY.S.2d at 351. At the time
this article went to press, the status of the lawsuit was unclear. Because the appellate court
split 3-2 in its decision, the plaintiffs had an automatic right of appeal to the New York
Court of Appeals, the state's court of last resort. See Stull, supra. The plaintiffs filed their
appeal on September 28, 2009, and the Court of Appeals will likely hear the case sometime
in early 2010. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-07
(N.Y. Sept. 28, 2009) (on file with author).
123. See Duncan Complaint, supra note 102, at 2-5; Hurrell-Harring Complaint, supra
note 102, at 5.
124. Joel Stashenko, Suit Proceeds over Providing Criminal Defense to Poor, 240 N.Y.
L.J. 1 (2008).
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"The action primarily seeks a declaration that the State has failed
in its constitutional duty to provide meaningful and effective
assistance of counsel to indigent criminal defendants.... It would
not require the judiciary to manage discretionary aspects of an
essentially executive function of government. Rather it seeks a
determination that the State has or is likely to violate the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights.,
125
Similarly, in June 2009, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed a
lower court decision on several issues, thereby allowing the Michigan class
action to move forward. 126 In its decision, the court of appeals rejected the
state's arguments regarding governmental immunity, justiciability, and
class certification. 127 The ability of these suits to make it out of the gates is,
in itself, a mark of the success of second-generation suits. Judges are
recognizing-and the legislature is being urged to recognize in these
jurisdictions121-that indigent defense is the state's responsibility and that
the bench need not punt these cases on procedural grounds. Given that
these suits have been more successful than their first-generation
predecessors, it is important to identify the attributes of these suits that
explain their success. That is the aim of the next section of this article.
B. Second-Generation Suits: The New Model for Systemic Sixth
Amendment Claims
Based on this body of litigation, one may say that there is a new model
for successful systemic litigation of indigent defense. In particular, these
suits share five features that are critical for impact lawyers to recognize
and replicate in future suits. First, in the jurisdictions where lawyers
brought these suits, litigation was a last resort. Second, in all of these suits,
the plaintiffs' attorneys demonstrated actual harm to clients as a result of
the defense system. Third, these suits involved strategic procedural
decisions. Fourth, plaintiffs' counsel fleshed out the Sixth Amendment
claims in these suits by drawing upon accepted professional standards.
And finally, these suits entailed extensive alliances both within and
125. Id. (quoting Justice Devine).
126. Duncan v. State, Nos. 278652, 278858, 278860, 2009 WL 1640975 (Mich. Ct. App.
June 11, 2009). At the time this article went to press, the state had filed leave to appeal this
decision before the Michigan Supreme Court. See Email from Jim Neuhard, Michigan
Chief Appellate Defender, to author (Oct. 13, 2009, 15:20 EST) (on file with author). The
state supreme court hears cases on a discretionary basis, and it may be several months
before the parties know whether the suit will move forward. Id
127. Id. at *1-2.
128. See generally George Bundy Smith, Equal Justice for All in New York, ALB.
TIMES UNION, Aug. 12, 2008, at All (noting that the chief judge of New York State, Judith
Kaye, appointed a commission for the Future of Indigent Defense Services, which then
advocated for statewide delivery of defense services with reasonable and adequate
standards).
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external to the system being challenged. In this section, I address each
attribute in turn.
1. Litigation as a Last Resort
Successful second-generation suits were brought in jurisdictions where
other efforts had already been made to improve the public defense system
and litigation truly was a last resort. This aspect is critical for two reasons.
First, advocacy groups have to be thoughtful in where they deploy their
resources, and as attorneys experienced with these suits can attest, they
can be incredibly protracted and expensive." 9 It behooves litigants to
explore other avenues before taking an indigent defense crisis to the
courts.
Second, it is much easier for plaintiffs to convince a state court judge
to take jurisdiction over a systemic Sixth Amendment suit when other,
non-litigation strategies have already been pursued. For example, in
Montana, the complaint documented the defendant state actors' awareness
of and indifference to the indigent defense crisis. The 2002 complaint cited
to the fact that there had been two statewide studies of indigent defense in
1976 and a legislative report in 1982, all of which found that the mandates
of Gideon were not being met. 3 ° Despite legislative suggestions toward
reform, "Twenty years later, State Defendants have failed to implement
any of these reforms." '31
Similarly, in the Michigan suit, the 2007 Complaint alleged:
In 1978, 1986, 1992, 2002 and again in 2003, various statewide and
local committees and task forces -including a task force
appointed by the Defendant Governor herself-have condemned
the same deficiencies in Michigan's indigent defense system as
those upon which Plaintiffs base this Complaint. Each has
recommended the adoption of statewide standards and/or the
creation of a statewide indigent defense commission....
Defendants have disregarded each report and set of
recommendations. 
132
129. Telephone Interview with Robin Dahlberg, Senior Staff Attorney, ACLU (June
23, 2008); Telephone Interview with Corey Stoughton, Staff Attorney, N.Y. Civil Liberties
Union (June 5, 2008). For example, in 2006, the New York Civil Liberties Union
(NYCLU) reported that it had already spent three years investigating statewide public
defense problems. See Press Release, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, New York State Must
Reform Indigent Defense or Face Lawsuit, NYCLU Says (June 28, 2006), available at
http://www.nyclu.org/node/133. That threatened lawsuit is pending today, six years after
NYCLU lawyers began collecting the data upon which the Sixth Amendment claims were
ultimately brought.
130. See White Complaint, supra note 102, at 46.
131. Id.
132. Duncan Complaint, supra note 102, at 23-24.
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This historical context is vital because it allows the state court judge
presiding over the case to avoid the temptation to punt the issue and refer
the plaintiffs to the political process,, as earlier judges did when confronted
with systemic claims.133 Faced with the reality that the legislature has been
on notice for years and has failed to act, a state court judge is more likely
to take action.
2. System- Wide Proof of Actual Harm to Clients
a) Actual Harm
While it may sound elementary, determining whether there is systemic
harm to clients of the public defense system is both critical to the success
of the second-generation suits and time consuming to determine at the
outset. For example, before filing its current suit in Michigan, the ACLU
had received complaints regarding the indigent defense system in
Oklahoma, and the organization conducted an investigation regarding
potential systemic deficiencies. 134 Under Oklahoma's indigent defense
system, in most counties, attorneys are retained on a contract basis.'35 The
ACLU had received complaints that contract attorneys in several counties
were required to handle felony cases for a capped fee of $120.136 An
investigation revealed that many of these felony cases involved charges of
passing bad checks and drug possession.'37 According to qualified counsel,
in some instances, such as where actors within the criminal justice system
knew one another and cases could be handled expeditiously, the $120 fee
cap was not unreasonable.13 Because the fee cap was not unreasonably
low for all felony cases, the ACLU recognized that proving systemic
miscarriages of justice would not be feasible in the Oklahoma counties at
issue. Successful second-generation suits are not based upon idiosyncratic
harms, but rather systematic harms that can be proven at trial. 39
In contrast to the Oklahoma scenario, when the ACLU sued the state
133. See, e.g., Webb v. Commonwealth, 528 S.E.2d 138, 145 (Va. Ct. App. 2000)
(reflecting Court's opinion that "redress must come from the General Assembly").
134. Telephone Interview with Robin Dahlberg, supra note 129.
135. OKLA. INDIGENT DEF. SYs., ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2008), available at http://
www.ok.gov/OIDS/documents/2008%2OAnnual%2OReport.pdf (explaining that contract
attorneys provide the majority of non-capital indigent defense trial services in fifty-six
counties, while staff attorneys do so in nineteen counties). See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 1355.8 (West 2003) (describing the contract award process).
136. Telephone Interview with Robin Dahlberg, supra note 129.
137. Id.
138. Id. The decision to not pursue a systemic claim based on these low rates of
attorney compensation does not reflect in any way the ACLU's approval of the pay
structure. Rather, it reflects the strategic selection of cases that present pervasive
miscarriages of justice.
139. Id.
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of Michigan, its complaint highlighted glaring systemic deficiencies.
Having delegated its constitutional responsibility to provide indigent
defendants with counsel to Michigan's eighty-three counties, the state
provided no oversight of the counties to ensure adequate funding or
practice guidelines.14 ° In the absence of state funding and state oversight,
the complaint documented the crisis that ensued in three counties.' In all
three counties there were no written client eligibility standards; no merit-
based attorney hiring and retention programs; no written attorney
performance standards; no guidelines for conflict of interest cases; no
attorney workload limits; inadequate attorney training; and a lack of
independence from the judicial and prosecutorial function.142 As a result,
clients of the system did not confer with counsel before critical stages of
the criminal process, and there was a lack of meaningful contact between
clients and assigned counsel.143 Defense counsel sometimes failed to
conduct investigations that could support potential defenses, and failed to
prepare adequately for hearings and trial.'"
Similarly, in New York, the complaint'45 came on the heels of Chief
Judge Judith Kaye's creation of a commission to study indigent defense
reform in the state.146 The commission's report documented widespread
miscarriages of justice and provided essential data that lawyers needed to
demonstrate a systemic Sixth Amendment claim in court.147
Thus, as a threshold matter, a successful systemic suit requires a
determination that there are in fact widespread miscarriages of justice
occurring within the system.
b) Ability to Prove the Harm
In addition to confirming that an indigent defense system is regularly
generating miscarriages of justice, second-generation suits marshal both
anecdotal and empirical evidence to prove those miscarriages in an
140. See Duncan Complaint, supra note 102, at 3.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 3-4.
143. See, e.g., id. at 6-7 (reporting that one class member met his attorney for the first.
time on the day of his preliminary examination and agreed to a guilty plea after a five-
minute conversation with his attorney). Many other instances demonstrating the lack of
meaningful contact between clients and assigned counsel are documented throughout the
Duncan Complaint.
144. See, e.g., id. at 9-11 (describing client whose lawyer failed to challenge
admissibility of evidence in case involving warrantless search, failed to negotiate plea offer,
and failed to prepare for trial).
145. Hurrell-Harring Complaint, supra note 102.
146. See COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT TO THE
CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2006), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.
us/ip/indigentdefense-commission/IndigentDefenseCommission-reportO6.pdf.
147. Id.
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adversarial setting.
The anecdotal evidence comes from research on the ground and is
essential to the pleadings stage. In the Pennsylvania suit, the third
amended complaint described the experience of one of the named
plaintiffs, "R.W."' 48 Prior to being committed to a psychiatric institution,
R.W. "had three hearings and was represented at each hearing by a
different public defender."' 49 Each meeting lasted only a few minutes, and,
although R.W. told each attorney that he did not want to be committed,
none of the defenders had him independently evaluated.15 ° The Michigan
complaint alleges that one of the named plaintiffs met with his attorney for
''approximately two minutes" at a preliminary examination conference and
did not have an opportunity to discuss his valid defenses, despite the fact
that he was facing more than twenty years in prison.' In the Montana
suit, the complaint alleged that, in at least one county, the contract for
indigent defense counsel "require[d] defense counsel to keep
'[investigative and expert] costs to a minimum.""'15  As a result of this
mandate, none of the defense counsel in the county requested investigative
or expert services in the two years prior to the filing of the Montana suit. 53
The same complaint alleged that "County Defendants and district court
judges have let it be known that they will deny requests for investigative
and expert witness services to minimize County expenses or that they will
retaliate against attorneys who do incur such expenses." '54 The complaints
in these cases demonstrate anecdotally the harm that clients are suffering
at the hands of a broken defense system.
In addition to this powerful anecdotal evidence, successful second-
generation suits are marked by collaboration with research groups that can
empirically document the details of an indigent defense crisis. In
particular, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA), a
policy group that advocates for equal access to justice, and the
Spangenberg Group, a research and consulting firm that specializes in
improving justice programs, have been instrumental to the success of these
more recent systemic suits. 55 For example, in the pending New York suit,
NLADA has generated "report cards" on nine of New York's counties,
148. Doyle Complaint, supra note 102, at 3-4.
149. Id. at 4.
150. Id.
151. Duncan Complaint, supra note 102, at 16-17.
152. White Complaint, supra note 102, at 42 (second alteration in original).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. For general information regarding the NLADA, see Nat'l Legal Aid & Defender
Assoc., http://www.nlada.org/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2009), and for information regarding the
Spangenberg Group, see George Mason Univ., The Spangenberg Project, http://
tsp.gmu.edu/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
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evaluating the counties' defense services in light of the American Bar
Association's (ABA's) "Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery
System" (Ten Principles).156  Prior to the ACLU's filing suit, the
Spangenberg Group generated a statewide evaluation for Judge Kaye's
commission."' By evaluating the systems in a professional, systematic
manner and documenting the indigent defense crisis empirically, these
groups have laid the groundwork for clear and convincing proof of
systemic constitutional violations at trial. In fact, when asked how she
explains the more recent wave of successful indigent defense litigation, one
attorney involved in this type of litigation answered simply, "Bob
Spangenberg."' 58
3. Strategic Procedural Decisions
Litigants in successful second-generation suits have carefully
addressed and strategically handled recurring procedural issues. First,
there is the challenge of selecting the parties in these suits. As a threshold
matter, where a class action certification is sought, the suit must assert that
named plaintiffs in the suit will "fairly and adequately protect the
interests" of the class of plaintiffs." 9 Above and beyond that, successful
second-generation suits include named plaintiffs who are "run of the mill"
and who "the average person on the street can relate to."'" Ideal named
plaintiffs are defendants who have been charged with nonviolent crimes,
such as a DUI or a nonviolent property crime.161 Individuals charged with
violent crimes or sex offenses are not well suited as named plaintiffs, for
the obvious reason that it is difficult to engender public sympathy for these
defendants. 62 The named plaintiffs cannot represent outlier cases; they
must be emblematic of systematic deprivations of the right to counsel.
Equally important, the named plaintiffs must address any potential
concerns implicated by the Supreme Court's ruling in Los Angeles v.
Lyons.'63 In Lyons, the plaintiff brought a civil rights action against the
city of Los Angeles, alleging that he had been subjected to an illegal
156. See, e.g., NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Assoc., PUBLIC DEFENSE REPORT
CARD, JEFFERSON COUNTY, available at http://www.nysda.org/08_NYJeffersonCounty.pdf
(last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
157. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN NEW YORK (2006),
available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-commission/Spangenberg
GroupReport.pdf.
158. Telephone Interview with Corey Stoughton, supra note 129 (referring to founder
of the Spangenberg Group).
159. See, e.g., Duncan Complaint, supra note 102, at 20.
160. Telephone Interview with Robin Dahlberg, supra note 129; Telephone Interview
with Corey Stoughton, supra note 129.
161. Telephone Interview with Robin Dahlberg, supra note 129.
162. Id.
163. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
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chokehold during a routine traffic stop."6 The Supreme Court held that
the plaintiff could not seek injunctive relief in federal court because he
failed to adequately state a case or controversy: "The plaintiff must show
that he 'has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury' as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or
threat of injury must be both 'real and immediate,' not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical."'165  Accordingly, the Court found that while Lyons may
have suffered at the hands of illegal police conduct and could be entitled to
damages, that fact "does nothing to establish a real and immediate threat
that he would again be stopped for a traffic violation, or for any other
offense, by an officer or officers who would illegally choke him into
unconsciousness without any provocation or resistance on his part." '166
Thus, Lyons stands for the proposition that plaintiffs seeking injunctive
relief in federal court must assert an ongoing violation or one that is likely
to occur again in the future.
In the Sixth Amendment setting, Lyons suggests that plaintiffs need to
allege ongoing deprivation of the right to counsel, rather than isolated
instances of ineffective assistance of counsel that occurred in the past. For
example, in the Allegheny County suit, one of the named plaintiffs was
described as someone who had a history of mental illness and
homelessness, and was "likely to be the subject of involuntary commitment
proceedings in the future., 167 Further, the complaint alleged, "Because of
the long-standing nature of the Public Defender program's lack of
resources and systemic deficiencies, he will again be deprived of effective
assistance of counsel or subject to the real and immediate threat of such an
injury., 168 Addressing the Lyons issue is closely tied to the first attribute of
successful suits: proving that the right to counsel has been historically
denied. The longer a system has been in crisis, the easier it is to argue that
clients of the system are likely to suffer ongoing constitutional violations.
169
Equally, it is important that the named plaintiffs are individuals whose
cases may have turned out differently had counsel been competent. For
164. Id. at 97-98.
165. Id. at 101-02.
166. Id. at 105.
167. Doyle Complaint, supra note 102, at 4.
168. Id. See also id. at 5-6 (describing a juvenile who remained in detention, without a
delinquency hearing and without objection from her public defender, past the allowable
statutory period).
169. On a related note, because criminal prosecutions are not necessarily stayed when
civil Sixth Amendment challenges are mounted, plaintiffs' counsel need to argue that the
class certification remains appropriate even as the named plaintiffs move through the
criminal justice system. See, e.g., Duncan v. State, Nos. 278652, 278858, 278860, 2009 WL
1640975, at *43 (Mich. Ct. App. June 11, 2009) (finding class certification appropriate
notwithstanding the fact that "class members constitute a fluid class and the attendant
criminal proceedings will continually be in flux").
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example, the Montana suit named as one of its plaintiffs a woman whose
attorney chronically failed to return her phone calls and keep her apprised
of basic information regarding her case.17° Because her attorney neglected
to tell her of two pending court appearances, a bench warrant was issued
for her arrest.171 The Michigan complaint named as one of its plaintiffs a
woman who faces charges of solicitation of murder and conspiracy to
commit murder.172 Even though she had no prior criminal record and
claims that these charges stem from "threats made against her and her
young daughter by a neighbor's boyfriend,""17 her attorney has not had
significant contact with her and has not discussed the facts of her case or
any potential issues to investigate. As a result, at the time the complaint
was filed, she had languished in jail for several months.'74 Suits of this kind
need to deploy this type of outcome-determinative evidence in order to
persuade courts that conditions are dire.
Successful suits have confronted both political and legal issues when
selecting the named defendants. For example, because second-generation
suits have been brought in state court, the most recent suits have named
the state itself as the defendant-a tactic not available in federal court due
to sovereign immunity issues."5 At the same time, it may behoove litigants
to name several relevant state officials, even if those parties are ultimately
sympathetic to the cause of indigent defense reform.176 Named defendants
have an obvious incentive to encourage settlement of the case.
Another example of careful procedural decision making involves the
choice of where to file suit. In two systemic indigent defense cases in
Massachusetts, plaintiffs sought relief not at the trial court level, but in the
state's highest court, successfully arguing that the court had the
discretionary power to review inferior state court proceedings."' This
move, where possible, may provide quicker relief for the class of criminal
defendants at issue, while also saving the group bringing suit years of
litigation and untold resources."' 8
170. White Complaint, supra note 102, at 11.
171. Id
172. Duncan Complaint, supra note 102, at 15.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 727-30 (1999) (discussing the textual and
structural basis for the doctrine that states cannot be sued in federal court without their
consent).
176. See, e.g., White Complaint, supra note 102, at 1 (naming as defendants Governor
Martz, the state Supreme Court Administrator, a district court judge in one of the named
defendant counties, and several other officials).
177. See Arianna S. v. Commonwealth, No. SJ-2004-0282 (Mass. dismissed as moot
Oct. 30, 2007); Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 907-08
(Mass. 2004).
178. Interview with Robert L. Spangenberg, President, The Spangenberg Group (June
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4. Reference to Accepted Professional Standards
Second-generation suits rely upon accepted professional standards
both to measure the shortcomings of a system and to craft the remedies
sought.179 Despite the Supreme Court's mandate in Gideon v. Wainwright
that poor people have access to counsel when they are "haled into
court," 8 the Gideon Court did not announce what the states must do to
satisfy this right. 8 And yet, for judges to assess complaints regarding
attorney caseloads and other systemic flaws, they need benchmarks against
which to measure complaints. In recent years, the defense community has
created these benchmarks, and the second-generation suits have benefited
accordingly.18
In particular, these suits draw upon the ABA's "Criminal Justice
Standards," '1 83 the NLADA's "Performance Guidelines for Criminal
Defense Representation,"'" the NLADA's "Guidelines for Negotiating
and Awarding Governmental Contracts for Criminal Defense Services,"'185
and the ABA's Ten Principles. 86 Promulgated in 2002, the Ten Principles
include: (1) independence of the defense function, (2) a caseload
management system, (3) prompt screening for and assignment to indigent
defense counsel, (4) adequate time and space for counsel to meet with
defendants, (5) workload controls to ensure adequate representation, (6)
training and experience requirements for attorneys, (7) continuous
representation throughout a defendant's case, (8) resource parity between
the defense and prosecution functions, (9) continuing legal education for
defense counsel, and (10) supervision and review of defense counsel's
20, 2008).
179. See sources cited infra notes 183-85.
180. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
181. See generally Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon's Trumpet, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 1461 (2003) (discussing in detail the Gideon decision and the issues it
left unanswered, including what would be required of states to implement the newly-
recognized right to counsel or at what point the right attached).
182. See, e.g., Bernhard, supra note 26, at 335-40 (discussing attorney eligibility and
performance standards, as well as standards for the administration of a defense system);
Scott Wallace & David Carroll, The Implementation and Impact of Indigent Defense
Standards, 31 S.U. L. REV. 245, 252 n.13 (2004) (identifying professional standards for
defense lawyers developed over the last three decades).
183. ABA, Criminal Justice Standards, http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/
home.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
184. Nat'l Legal Aid & Defender Assoc., Performance Guidelines for Criminal
Defense Representation, http://www.nlada.org/Defender/DefenderStandards/
PerformanceGuidelines (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
185. Nat'l Legal Aid & Defender Assoc., Guidelines for Negotiating and Awarding
Governmental Contracts for Criminal Defense Services, http://www.nlada.org/Defender/
DefenderStandardsfNegotiating-AndAwardingID_Contracts (last visited Oct. 7,2009).
186. THE TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 13.
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performance." 7
These principles reflect two interrelated, overarching goals: (1) to
provide the client with a lawyer who is equipped with the skills, time, and
resources to handle the client's case; and (2) to ensure that the lawyer has
the requisite training, background, support, and oversight to provide
effective representation.
These standards are beneficial to litigants because they allow
plaintiffs' counsel to measure the system's shortcomings against an
objective predetermined index of factors, and because they assist courts
and legislative bodies in crafting appropriate remedies. In the New York
suit, discussed earlier in this section, the NLADA has provided report
cards that are expressly based upon the ABA's Ten Principles for nine of
New York's counties."' Similarly, the complaint for the suit pending in
Michigan cites the Ten Principles as reflecting "a national consensus
regarding the prerequisites for constitutionally adequate indigent
defense." '189 Once there is consensus in a jurisdiction that reform is
required, the Ten Principles provide a template for that reform effort.
Montana's public defense bill, for example, was the first passed in the
nation that was specifically "crafted with the intent of addressing the 'Ten
Principles.""9 Thus, the development of substantive standards that define
the right to counsel in practical terms has enhanced the likelihood of
success in second-generation suits.
5. Alliances Within and External to the System Being Challenged
The second-generation suits have demonstrated that, in order for the
litigation to get off the ground and to generate lasting results, allies in the
process are essential. Ideally, there need to be allies both within and
external to the system being challenged. For example, in some systems,
the public defense administrators may aspire to provide better services but
simply need more resources. In that case, the chief public defender or a
similar official may be an ally in the reform effort.191 At the same time,
rank and file public defenders can be a vital source of information."
Other than the clients of the system, these defenders are the best source of
information regarding attorney-client contact, continuity of representation,
187. Id at 3-6.
188. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
189. Duncan Complaint, supra note 102, at 22.
190. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Hails Montana's Public Defense Bill as Leading
National Trend (June 8, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/crimjustice/indigent/
10248prs20050608.html.
191. Telephone Interview with Robin Dahlberg, supra note 129.
192. Telephone Interview with Witold "Vic" Walczak, Legal Dir., Amer. Civil
Liberties Union of Pa. (Aug. 13, 2008).
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and investigative resources.'93
Likewise, those who hold elected positions can be powerful allies in
the reform process. State judges who have witnessed Sixth Amendment
violations in their courtrooms for years may be advocates for change. In
New York, as discussed in the next section of this article, former Chief
Judge Judith Kaye was instrumental in laying the groundwork for the
ACLU's current suit."' Retired judge George Bundy Smith has also been
a vocal proponent of a legislative solution to New York's indigent defense
crisis. 9 A supreme court justice in Nevada has been active in seeking
indigent defense reform,'96 while in Massachusetts, two former attorneys
general were involved in crafting a solution to the defense funding crisis.'97
Once individuals with "power and clout" are involved, the reform process
moves faster and, at the same time, reform efforts may garner more media
attention."' This is vital. As one ACLU attorney noted, educating the
public on the facts of an indigent defense crisis is a necessary step toward
reform, and, as a result, these reform attorneys "litigate as much in the
media as they do in court.
199
C. Assessing Second-Generation Litigation
Reflecting upon the body of second-generation suits, one may say that
there is a new model for structural litigation of indigent defense. The
model is based on careful preparation and empirical evidence gathering,
strategic procedural decision making from the outset, reference to existing
professional standards, and reliance upon the support of powerful allies
within a criminal justice system.
This is not to say that the model is static. Two issues are worth noting.
First, a review of the second-generation suits reveals some evolution.
Lawsuits have evolved to target states, rather than counties, and advocates
193. Id. Impact litigation attorneys working with a public defender's office in
preparation for a lawsuit need to be mindful of the ethical rules implicated by such
communication. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2002) ("[T]his Rule
prohibits communications with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or
regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to
obligate the organization with respect to the matter or whose act or omission in connection
with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal
liability."). Accordingly, investigating attorneys may not speak with policymakers within
the defense function without telling them that they are being sued.
194. See infra Part III.B.1.
195. See Smith, supra note 128.
196. Press Release, Nev. Supreme Court, Nevada Supreme Court Commission to
Examine Indigent Defense (Apr. 13, 2007), available at http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/
index.php/supnews/216-nevada-supreme-court-commission-to-examine-indigent-defense.
html.
197. Interview with Robert L. Spangenberg, supra note 178.
198. Id.
199. Telephone Interview with Witold "Vic" Walczak, supra note 192.
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have reached outside their jurisdictions for models of reform. For
example, while the Pennsylvania suit targeted Allegheny County as the
provider of county defense services,2° the more recent lawsuits in
Montana, New York, and Michigan have argued that the state has
abdicated its Sixth Amendment obligations to indigents by requiring
counties to pay for public defense. 20 ' Today, many experts in this field
agree that a statewide public defense system is the best kind of system,
2 2
and the most recent suits are attempting to create law that places the
burden of Gideon's mandate squarely on the state. 23 To date, no suit has
resulted in a judicial judgment that the state cannot delegate the funding of
the public defense function to its counties, and advocates may continue to
seek such a ruling.
The model described in this section is dynamic in another way. As the
suits around the nation have demonstrated, sometimes reform in one state
can trickle into the next state, sparking reform without a lawsuit. This has
definitely been the case in Montana and its neighboring states. The
Montana legislature's passage of the Public Defense Bill has already
generated reform in North Dakota,2 4 and Idaho appears poised to move
toward Montana's model.2 °5 Increasingly, impact litigation attorneys are
recognizing that they can achieve regional reform by selectively targeting
one state.206 While there appears to be a template to follow in structuring
reform efforts, it is nonetheless a dynamic one.
A second issue worth noting is that even when litigants have followed
the model described herein, not all efforts have been successful. The
recent suit in Mississippi might be seen as the outlier case. In Quitman
County v. State, Quitman County sued the State of Mississippi, arguing
that the state had abdicated its constitutional responsibility to provide for
200. See Doyle Complaint, supra note 102.
201. See Duncan Complaint, supra note 102; White Complaint, supra note 102;
Hurrell-Haring Complaint, supra note 102.
202. See, e.g., THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATE INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSIONS 5
(2006) (describing the different funding systems in the various states and endorsing full
state funding, with a few exceptions); Simon, supra note 12, at 592-94 (comparing
Minnesota's and Mississippi's indigent defense funding systems and concluding that
statewide funding systems are superior, but also noting that findings based on these two
states are not necessarily representative of other states with similar systems).
203. Telephone Interview with David Carroll, Dir. of Research & Evaluation, Nat'l
Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n (Aug. 26, 2008). Mr. Carroll noted that those involved in
these suits have recognized that suits like the ones in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania are
not as effective at generating system-wide reform and that the more recent suits seek
statewide reform.
204. See Press Release, ACLU, supra note 190 (noting the spill-over effect from
reform in Montana to reform in North Dakota).
205. Telephone Interview with Carroll, supra note 203.
206. Id.
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the defense of indigent state defendants.2 °7 Under the Mississippi State
Constitution, counties, were responsible for the provision of indigent
defense services.28 The county sought a declaratory judgment ruling that
the county-funded system was unconstitutional and that the state must
provide a statewide, state-funded indigent defense system.
2 9
In many ways the Ouitman suit comported with the model of second-
generation litigation that I have described in this section. Litigation was
indeed a measure of last resort, as the state's defense shortcomings had
been documented for years yet little was done to remedy them.2 10 The
attorneys involved in the suit made strategic procedural decisions, most
notably in selecting Quitman County as the plaintiff and Mississippi as the
defendant. In Mississippi, there is no state court class action mechanism,1
and naming the county as the plaintiff addressed that hurdle. The suit
made reference to deficiencies in ensuring adequate representation
according to general professional standards212 and drew upon powerful
allies. The law firm of Arnold & Porter provided pro bono legal services,
and numerous amicus parties supported the cause.213  And yet, the suit
failed.
After surviving a motion to dismiss the county was required on
remand to prove beyond a reasonable doubt "the cost of an effective
system of indigent criminal defense, the county's inability to fund such a
system, and the failure of the existing system to provide indigent
207. Quitman County v. State, 910 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (Miss. 2005).
208. MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 261 ("The expenses of criminal prosecutions shall be
borne by the county in which such prosecution shall be begun ...."). See also MISS. CODE
ANN. § 25-32-7 (West 2003) (detailing county funding requirements for public defender
offices).
209. State v. Quitman County, 807 So. 2d 401, 403 (Miss. 2001).
210. See Erin V. Everett, Salvation Lies Within: Why the Mississippi Supreme Court
Can and Should Step In to Solve Mississippi's Indigent Defense Crisis, 74 Miss. L.J. 213,
217-29 (2004) (advocating judicial reform as a response to the legislature's history of failing
to address the ongoing indigent defense crisis). See generally NAACP LEGAL DEF. &
EDUC. FUND, supra note 4.
211. See Miss. R. Civ. P.23. See also Howard M. Erichson, Mississippi's Class Actions
and the Inevitability of Mass Aggregate Litigation, 24 MIss. C. L. REV. 285, 285-87 (2005)
(discussing the state's lack of a class action mechanism and arguing for its adoption).
212. Complaint at 4-6, Quitman County v. State, No. 99-0126 (Miss. Cir. Ct. Nov. 10,
2003), available athttp://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/detail.php?id=10068.
213. See, e.g., Brief for the Mississippi Ass'n of Supervisors as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Defendant-Appellee, Quitman County v. State, 910 So. 2d 1032 (Miss. 2005)
(No. 2003-SA-02658); Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, Quitman County, 910 So. 2d 1032 (No. 2003-
SA-02658); Brief for National Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Plaintiff-Appellant, Quitman County, 910 So. 2d 1032 (No. 2003-SA-02658). All amicus
briefs in this case can be found through the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse site. See
Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, Home, http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/ (last visited
Oct. 7, 2009).
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defendants in Quitman County with the tools of an adequate defense. ',214
The county failed to do this. Dismissing the suit, the circuit judge noted:
"The County alleged that there have been numerous post-
conviction challenges to the adequacy of counsel provided to
indigent defendants tried for felonies in Quitman County.
However, the County presented no evidence to the Court of any
post-conviction proceedings which challenged the effectiveness of
appointed counsel. The County did not present proof from any
defendant who claimed to have received ineffective assistance, nor
did they identify any single case where ineffective assistance was
alleged. No proof was presented that any case has ever been
overturned in Quitman County because of ineffective
assistance.
215
The state supreme court affirmed dismissal of the suit.216
The failure of the Ouitman case demonstrates two important points.
First, empirical and anecdotal evidence of actual harm to clients due to the
system is imperative for a successful suit. In Ouitman, while the county
attempted to demonstrate the shortcomings of the system through expert
testimony, it failed to offer testimony from actual clients of the system-
precisely those individuals who were in a position to speak from personal
experience regarding issues such as perceived pressure to plea, contact
time with their attorney, and other factors relevant to the court's ultimate
decision."a' Second, the case suggests that a federal forum may be required
to hear suits of this kind. In Mississippi, because there is no state class
action mechanism, the model described in this section can only be pursued
effectively in federal court. 18 In other states, it may be a hostile bench,
and not the absence of a procedural tool, that bars the model of suit
described in this section. In the next section of the article I address the
question of how future litigants may bring such a suit in federal court.
Even if one recognizes that this model of litigation is an evolving one,
and that it is not a guarantee for success, it nonetheless represents a vast
improvement upon earlier, reactive suits challenging indigent defense
systems. I contend that defense advocates can and should draw upon this
model in future litigation efforts. Going forward, it is worth asking what
the third generation of structural litigation to improve indigent defense
214. Quitman County, 910 So. 2d at 1037.
215. Id. (quoting the lower court's opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
216. Id. at 1048.
217. See Brief for Appellee at 12-13, Ouitman County, 910 So.2d 1032 (No. 2003-SA-
02658) (discussing the county's decision to put on three public defense experts rather than
actual clients of the system). See also id. at 27-31 (discussing some of the inherent
limitations in relying upon defense experts).
218. See Erichson, supra note 211.
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may look like. The next section of the article takes on that question.
III.
THE THIRD GENERATION OF INDIGENT DEFENSE LITIGATION
As the previous section of this article identified, there is now a robust
model for successful litigation of indigent defense issues, and impact
lawyers can replicate that model elsewhere going forward. Future suits
will benefit not only from the template for strategic litigation discussed in
Part II, but also from a "traction" factor. As more of these suits are filed,
and in particular, where they generate the creation of new law, especially
through judicial opinions, courts are more apt to be receptive to the
underlying sentiment of these suits-the idea that courts have the ability,
and in fact, the responsibility, to ensure effective representation for
indigent defendants.
There is good reason to think that there will be a third generation of
indigent defense litigation. First, the indigent defense crisis persists in
many pockets across the country.219 Second, as litigation becomes an
increasingly refined and more successful tool, it may become the preferred
alternative to a prolonged legislative campaign.220 Where may this
litigation occur? There are several jurisdictions that may be ripe for the
third generation of indigent defense litigation.
First, given that experts agree that a statewide system is preferable to a
patchwork county-based system, those states with no state funding or with
a majority of county-based funding may face lawsuits. These jurisdictions
include Pennsylvania and Utah, where counties provide 100% of indigent
defense funds, as well as states such as South Carolina, Texas, Idaho, and
Nebraska, where counties provide more than 50% of defense monies.22'
Second, a number of jurisdictions are dealing with immediate funding
crises that may prompt litigation, including Florida, Missouri, and
Georgia.222 Finally, while many people assume that the indigent defense
crisis is largely a southern crisis, experts in the field of indigent defense
note that the so-called "Rust Belt" states suffer from equally dire indigent
219. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
220. See Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at Al (describing the public defense crisis and citing lawsuits pending
in several states that would allow defenders to turn down cases).
221. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 202, at 5.
222. See Susannah A. Nesmith, Dade Public Defender" Caseload Is Untenable, MIAMI
HERALD, July 31, 2008, at 1B; Greg Bluestein, Ga. Public Defenders Reluctantly Agree to
Cuts, INT'L BUS. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/ 20080926/ga-public-
defenders-reluctantly-agree-to-cuts.htm; Barb Shelly, Missouri Is Ducking Its
Responsibilities to Fund Public Defenders, KANSASCITY.COM, Aug. 3, 2008, http://voices.
kansascity.com/node/1780.
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defense conditions. 23 As a result, systemic litigation in Illinois, Indiana,
and Ohio-all states where the counties shoulder more than 50% of the
defense burden2 24 -may be on the horizon. For these reasons, this article
proceeds on the assumption that there will be a third generation of
indigent defense litigation.
With that in mind, this section of the article has two goals: (1) to
identify issues for future litigants of these systemic suits to consider and (2)
to describe steps that the individual defense attorney can take when she is
working in the midst of an indigent defense crisis and systemic litigation is
not on the horizon.
A. Future Litigation: Additional Strategies
Despite the success of the second-generation model relative to its first-
generation predecessors, it is worth considering what can be done to
further improve third-generation suits seeking reform of indigent defense.
Recognizing that litigation will always be an "imperfect tool, '225 how can
the next generation of suits better tackle some of the issues that continue
to plague indigent defense systems? In this section of the article, I discuss
two specific issues for future litigants to consider: (1) post-litigation
activism and (2) pursuit of a federal forum.
1. Planning Post-litigation Efforts
Future litigants of these types of suits need to go into the process
cognizant of the fact that the suit is often just the beginning of a long-term
advocacy effort. A successful settlement or the passage of good legislation
needs to be sustained with (1) a politically independent oversight
commission, (2) adequate funding, and (3) an organized and vocal defense
bar.
a) Establishing a Politically-Independent Oversight Commission
Independent research of defense systems nationwide demonstrates the
importance of a politically independent oversight commission. 22' A recent
report from the Spangenberg Group explains that "there has been a clear
trend among the states toward the creation of a state body to be
responsible for the delivery of indigent defense services throughout the
state."227  An effective statewide commission can perform a number of
necessary functions: it can protect the defense function from political and
223. Telephone Interview with David Carroll, supra note 203.
224. THE SPAGENBERG GROUP, supra note 202, at 5.
225. Telephone Interview with Robin Dahlberg, supra note 129.
226. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 202.
227. Id. at 18.
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judicial interference; it can provide accountability and oversight; it can
compile accurate statistical information so that the health of a defense
system can be monitored; it can set performance standards and other
policies for the defense system; and it can advocate for adequate defense
funding.2 8 Accordingly, future litigants need to seek the creation and
implementation of a statewide oversight body.
b) Securing and Protecting Funding for the Defense System
Most experts agree that, while funding is certainly not the only
implementation challenge for a public defense system, it is the most
intractable one.229 A lack of adequate funding can hamper even the best
plan for the delivery of defense services.
When the suit was filed in Montana challenging the state's delegation
of the defense function to the counties, funding was a key aspect of the
complaint.23 ° Montana legislation provided that "the State will only
reimburse to the extent funding is available and that '[i]f money
appropriated for [indigent defense expenses] is insufficient to fully fund
those expenses, the county is responsible for payment of the balance.'
231
As a result, counties were more concerned about "minimiz[ing] their
financial exposure" than providing constitutionally adequate indigent
defense services.232 In order to avoid a dynamic that enables both state
and county actors to shirk responsibility, third-generation litigants need to
seek full state funding of the defense function. Today, twenty-eight states
have fully state-funded indigent defense systems,2 33 so there is strong
evidence for the claim that full state funding is the mainstream choice, as
well as the choice supported by experts in the field.
Georgia provides a good example of the harm that can result when the
state and counties share funding responsibilities. In 2003, the Georgia
General Assembly passed the Georgia Indigent Defense Act, 4 ushering in
a centralized body to oversee indigent defense services in the state: the
Georgia Public Defender Standards Council.235 This council was charged
with creating public defender offices throughout the state, setting quality
standards for defense services, and monitoring the administration of these
228. See id.
229. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 12, at 586 ("Inadequate funding is the primary source
of the systemic failure in indigent defense programs nationwide.").
230. See White Complaint, supra note 102, at 3 ("The State permits the Counties to
underfund their indigent defense services to the point where the lack of financial resources
impedes the delivery of representation."). See also id. at 32-33.
231. Id. at 33 (alterations in original).
232. Id
233. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 202, at 5.
234. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-12-1 to -128 (2008 & Supp. 2009).
235. §§ 17-12-1 to -14.
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services.2 36 In addition, under the Act, the state was required to provide
counsel in all capital cases through the newly created Georgia Capital
Defender Office.237 Funding for the state's new scheme was addressed in
subsequent legislation.
In the 2004 legislative session, a funding bill, HB 1EX, was passed,
creating additional fees and surcharges specifically earmarked to fund the
new indigent defense system. There was an increase of fifteen dollars in
the filing fee in all civil actions, a ten percent surcharge on criminal fines, a
ten percent surcharge on bails or bonds with a fifty-dollar cap, and a newly
created fifty-dollar waivable application fee for indigent defendants. The
collection from these fees/fines was anticipated to reach $32.1 million in
fiscal year 2005 and $42.08 million in fiscal year 2006. Of the fees imposed,
the counties keep the revenue generated from the fifty-dollar application
fees collected by the lower courts, and all other fees are remitted to the
State treasury.
2 38
Because the majority of the collected fees for the system are remitted
to the state treasury, the funding bill provides little protection for the
stability and adequacy of indigent defense services."' In recent years, the
statewide defense system in Georgia has faced several fiscal crises and has
had to repeatedly request emergency appropriations to stay afloat. 4°
Prior to the lawsuit in Massachusetts described, supra, in Part II, a
similar statutory provision allowed the Massachusetts state legislature to
starve the defense system of necessary funds. Under Massachusetts law,
the Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS) had the authority to
"'establish rates of compensation payable, subject to appropriation, to all
counsel who are appointed or assigned to represent indigents."'241 In 2002,
CPCS set the following rates of compensation for private counsel who
accepted public defense appointments: "sixty dollars an hour for District
Court cases, ninety dollars an hour for cases 'not within the final
jurisdiction of the District Court,' and one hundred twenty dollars an hour
236. § 17-12-1.
237. § 17-12-6.
238. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES FOR
INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 10 (2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/downloads/FINALREPORTFY200
5_ExpenditureReport.pdf (emphasis added).
239. Id. See also NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT,
JUSTICE DENIED 57-58 (2009) (describing the redirection of funds in Georgia originally
raised for the benefit of indigent defense), available at http://www.tcpjusticedenied.orgl.
240. See, e.g., Bill Rankin, Public Defender Panel Balks on Budget, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Aug. 29, 2008, at D1 (discussing the fact that the legislature allocated to the public
defense system five million less than the fees collected explicitly for the system).
241. Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 901 (Mass.
2004).
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for murder cases. ' '242 Yet, when the Supreme Judicial Court considered
this issue in 2004, the rates appropriated by the legislature for private
counsel were "thirty dollars an hour for a District Court case, thirty-nine
dollars an hour for a Superior Court case other than a homicide case, and
fifty-four dollars an hour for a homicide case., 143 These rates had basically
been unchanged since 1986, and at the time, they were among the lowest in
the nation.2"
In future suits, the revenue source allocated for the defense function
needs to be adequate in theory,245 and it needs to be protected in the
political process. As I have discussed in this section, the consensus among
experts is that full state funding is the most stable way to fund a defense
system, and this should be sought by litigants. Whether or not the state
fully funds the defense function, the statewide commission needs to press
for "lock box" measures that will protect the funding earmarked for public
defense.246 Otherwise, legislative tampering with earmarked funds, as the
Massachusetts and Georgia cases demonstrate, is likely to ensue.
c) Organizing the Defense Bar
In addition to being involved in long-term funding issues, litigants of
third-generation suits need to advocate for an organized and vocal defense
bar.217 For example, where a lawsuit results in the creation of new public
defender positions, lawyers involved in the litigation can urge these
attorneys to become dues-paying and active members of the state defense
bar. 48 In doing so, litigants can help expand and enhance the voice of the
defense community in the political process.
Finally, as much as third-generation litigants need to collaborate in the
post-litigation efforts I have described in this section, impact attorneys also
need to be prepared to return to court where states fails to uphold their
242. Id at 900-01.
243. Id. at 900.
244. Id. (citing THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 238).
245. For example, the defense system cannot depend upon an arbitrary and unreliable
source of revenue. In New Orleans, parking tickets were the primary source of revenue for
the indigent defense system. As a result, when Hurricane Katrina destroyed the city, the
already unstable revenue source was eliminated and thousands of people languished in
jail-sometimes for months without even being charged. See Henry Weinstein, 2500
Arrested Before Katrina Are Stillin Limbo, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 20, 2005, at A38.
246. Cf Social Security and Medicare Lock-Box Act, H.R. 4338, 110th Cong. (2007)
(introduced, but never enacted, this bill that would have established a procedure to
safeguard surplus funds from Social Security and Medicare), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hllO-4338.
247. A vocal and organized defense bar can promote the quality of public defense
services in a number of critical ways. Such a bar can (1) gather and disseminate data
regarding best practices; (2) educate the public regarding indigent defense services; and (3)
educate and, where necessary, lobby the executive and legislative bodies.
248. Telephone Interview with Scott Crichton, supra note 118.
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end of the bargain.249
Thus, even where litigation is successful and generates either good
case law or new legislation, impact attorneys need to be prepared to
monitor the implementation of public defense improvements. Under the
best case scenario, future litigants need to remain involved in long-term
advocacy-including creating a politically independent oversight
commission, lobbying for adequate funding, and organizing the defense
bar. Under the worst case scenario, plaintiffs' counsel need to be prepared
to return to court. As impact attorneys consider where to deploy their
resources, they need to anticipate that with systematic litigation, the suit is
often just the beginning.
2. Creating a Federal Forum
Another issue that future litigants of these suits need to consider is the
appropriateness and availability of a federal forum."' 0 Thirty-nine states
elect some or all of their judges."' 1 Moreover, in some jurisdictions, judges
must actively run for reelection.252 If these judges are in jurisdictions
where the populace is more concerned about victims' rights than
defendants' rights, there is good reason to think that these judges are
subject to the same pressure to be perceived as "tough on crime" as
politicians often are."5 3 And in fact, scholars have documented numerous
instances where elected judges have lost their seats because of unpopular
decisions, particularly those involving the death penalty.2"4 Federal judges,
insulated from this pressure, may be better suited to hear a systemic Sixth
Amendment claim.
249. See, e.g., Reddy, supra note 26, at 27-30 (noting that the ACLU filed contempt
motions twice in the wake of its Pennsylvania suit to enforce terms of the consent decree).
Mr. Crichton explained that part of the Montana settlement agreement was the ability for
the ACLU to return to court if the state did not meet its commitment to create a new
public defense system. Telephone Interview with Scott Crichton, supra note 118.
250. I have advanced this idea elsewhere in a slightly different form. See Cara H.
Drinan, Toward a Federal Forum for Systemic Sixth Amendment Claims, WASH U. L.R.,
Oct. 22, 2008, http://lawreview.wustl.edu/slip-opinions/toward-a-federal-forum-for-systemic
-sixth-amendment-claims/.
251. ABA, FACT SHEET ON JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS IN THE STATES, available at
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
252. Id
253. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty. Elective Judiciaries and the
Rule of La w, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 727-29 (1995).
254. See John D. Fabian, The Paradox of Elected Judges. Tension in the American
Judicial System, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 156-58 (2001). See also Penny J. White,
Judging Judges- Secuing Judicial Independence by Use of Judicial Performance
Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1074-75 (2002) (discussing interest groups'
"illegitimate outcome-oriented evaluation" of judges).
255. In Mississippi, the state's lack of a class action mechanism provides another
reason to pursue a federal forum. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
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While the federal courts historically have been a refuge for discrete
and insular minorities, 2 6 to date, a federal forum has not been available to
indigent defendants seeking to vindicate their Sixth Amendment right to
counsel on a systemic basis. 7  Federal courts that have considered
challenges to indigent defense systems have declined to award injunctive
relief to plaintiffs, citing principles of comity and federalism. 8
In Luckey v. Miller, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the plaintiffs'
request for a court order mandating an overhauled indigent defense
system in Georgia. The Luckey Court held that Younger v. Harris59
required the federal courts to abstain from interfering with ongoing state
criminal prosecutions to protect the "vital consideration of comity between
the state and national governments. ' '2 ' The Second Circuit took a similar
position when considering a class action challenge to the indigent defense
system in Kings County, New York. 61 Despite evidence of systemic
deficiencies, including excessive attorney caseloads, excessive delays in
bringing cases to trial, and excessive bail, the Second Circuit denied
injunctive relief.262 The court explained: "This is not the proper business of
the federal courts, which have no supervisory authority over the state
courts and have no power to establish rules of practice for the state
courts." 63 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits reached the same conclusion in
similar cases.2 6
These federal courts have erred in refusing to hear these cases on
federalism grounds, and, where litigants have the resources to do so, they
should make that argument in federal court. Younger should not apply to
256. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down a gender-based
statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (establishing minimal procedural safeguards for custodial criminal investigations);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racial segregation of public
schools violates the Equal Protection Clause).
257. See Gideon s Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 23, at 2077 ("A serious obstacle to
the future viability of litigated reform of the indigent defense is the lack of a federal forum
to hear such claims."). See also Bernhard, supra note 26, at 332-33.
258. See infra notes 275-277 and accompanying text.
259. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
260. Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 676 (11th Cir. 1992).
261. See Wallace v. Kern, 499 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir.1974).
262. See id.
263. Id. at 1351.
264. See Foster v. Kassulke, 898 F.2d 1144, 1146-47 (6th Cir. 1990) ("In seeking
injunctive relief in her section 1983 action, she is attempting to obtain federal review of
state court procedures in a criminal case before the state court has had the opportunity to
decide them finally. Federal review should be given in the context of a federal habeas
proceeding following the appropriate exhaustion of state remedies, where concerns of
equity, comity, and federalism-concerns that Younger teaches require abstention-are
accommodated."); Gardner v. Luckey, 500 F.2d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 1974) ("It is clear from
the face of their complaint that our appellants contemplate exactly the sort of intrusive and
unworkable supervision of state judicial processes condemned in O'Sbea.").
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these prospective Sixth Amendment claims, but even if it does, the
doctrine's exceptions should permit the federal courts to hear these cases.
First, the Younger abstention doctrine itself should not bar a federal
court from hearing a suit in which a class of indigent defendants seeks
prospective, injunctive relief.265 The Younger doctrine is based on two
rationales: (1) "the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of
equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal
prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and
will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief," and (2) the
notion of comity, which the Court described as "Our Federalism." '266
Neither rationale should preclude a suit designed to install future
improvements to a state's public defense system. A federal court could
declare that funding indigent defense is the state's responsibility, it could
establish hiring and training guidelines for defense counsel, and it could
announce attorney caseload guidelines without "restrain[ing] a criminal
prosecution.211
Moreover, federal courts can and have in the past addressed state
criminal process failings without stalling the state's prosecutorial function.
In Gerstein v. Pugh, Florida prisoners brought a class action claiming a
constitutional right to a judicial hearing on the issue of probable cause for
pretrial detention and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief.268 The
Supreme Court held that "the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of
liberty following arrest., 269 In doing so, the Court affirmed the district
court's position that the prisoners' request for relief was not barred by
Younger:
The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for relief
was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal
intervention in state prosecutions. The injunction was not
directed at the state prosecutions as such, but only at the legality
265. See Donald H. Zeigler, An Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine and the
Duty of the Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the State Criminal
Process, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 266, 290-300 (1976). See also Citron, supra note 26, at 494-96.
266. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (explaining "Our Federalism" in the
following way: "The concept does not mean blind deference to 'States' Rights' any more
than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National
Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept
does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both
State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though
it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to
do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.").
See also Citron, supra note 26, at 494-95.
267. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43.
268. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
269. Id. at 114.
Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law
2009]
N Y U. REVIEW OFLA W & SOCIAL CHANGE
of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that could
not be raised in defense of the criminal prosecution. The order to
hold preliminary hearings could not prejudice the conduct of the
trial on the merits.270
Thus, the Gerstein court protected a constitutional right even in the face of
ongoing state criminal proceedings.271
And Gerstein is not an outlier case. Whenever a federal court
dismisses a state criminal proceeding on the basis of a criminal defendant's
right to a speedy trial, the court ostensibly interferes with ongoing state
criminal proceedings.272 For that matter, one could argue that the entire
application of the exclusionary rule to the states interferes with ongoing
state criminal proceedings to the extent that the rule deprives prosecutors
of necessary, inculpatory evidence in pending cases. And yet, in these
instances, the federal courts have placed greater priority on protection of
individual constitutional rights than deference to the state criminal
process.
For example, in Mapp v. Ohio, where the Supreme Court held that all
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution
was inadmissible in a state criminal trial,273 the Court recognized that its
prior decision not to apply the exclusionary rule to the states had been a
mistake. As the Court described: "The ignoble shortcut to conviction left
open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional
restraints on which the liberties of the people rest., 274 In the body of
criminal procedure law, there is ample precedent for a federal court to
protect a defendant's prospective Sixth Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel without offending principles of federalism.
Yet, to date federal courts considering systemic indigent defense
claims have not relied upon these cases to circumvent abstention doctrine.
The Eleventh Circuit in Luckey affirmatively rejected the Gerstein
171comparison.   In dismissing a class action challenging a state public
defender office, the Fifth Circuit noted that the appropriate remedy for
indigent defendants was to "challenge the legality of their custody via
federal habeas corpus, subject, of course, to prior exhaustion of state
270. Id. at 108 n.9 (citations omitted).
271. See Citron, supra note 26, at 494 n.98 (citing Gerstein as precedent on which
federal courts can rely in these cases).
272. See Kloper v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (holding that Sixth
Amendment right to speedy trial applies to states). See also Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30
(1970) (reversing state conviction on speedy trial grounds); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374
(1969) (holding that speedy trial duty applies to states even when a defendant is in federal
prison).
273. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
274. Id. at 660.
275. Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 678-79 (11th Cir. 1992).
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remedies., 276 Similarly, when the Sixth Circuit abstained from hearing a
civil rights action challenging the indigent defense system in Kentucky, the
court referred the petitioner to the appellate and habeas process: "Federal
review should be given in the context of a federal habeas proceeding
following the appropriate exhaustion of state remedies, where concerns of
equity, comity, and federalism-concerns that Younger teaches require
abstention-are accommodated.,
277
Suggestions of this kind in the indigent defense context are
disingenuous. Not only does a state habeas claim depend upon a well-
preserved trial record (something unlikely to exist when one has received
ineffective assistance, if any assistance, at trial), but also, in some of the
most egregious ineffective assistance of counsel cases, the record is
irrelevant because it is precisely what counsel has failed to do that is the
essence of the claim. To add insult to injury, in some jurisdictions, the
state does not guarantee post-conviction representation.278  Indigent
defendants seeking prospective, injunctive relief do not have an adequate
remedy at law in state court, nor can they raise systemic issues, like
excessive caseloads that compromise the quality of their own
representation, in the course of their own defense. Younger, then, should
not bar federal courts from hearing a prospective suit seeking reform of a
public defense system. Second, even if Younger applies to these suits,
there is at least one line of "exception" cases that may defeat the
application of Younger abstention in this context.
While the exceptions to the abstention doctrine announced in
Younger itself are incredibly narrow and are not especially useful in this
context,279 subsequent federal court decisions have announced procedural
exceptions that may provide leverage for litigants in third-generation
indigent defense suits. 2 ° For example, in Mannes v. Gillespie, petitioner
Mannes sought federal habeas relief when a state prosecutor refiled
murder charges against her that a judge had previously dismissed.21 The
Ninth Circuit held that the district court was not required under Younger
to abstain from hearing her claim while the state charges were pending.282
276. Gardner v. Luckey, 500 F.2d 712, 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
277. Foster v. Kassulke, 898 F.2d 1144, 1146-47 (6th Cir. 1974).
278. See Sarah L. Thomas, A Legislative Challenge: A Proposed Model Statute to
Provide for the Appointment of Counsel in State Habeas Corpus Proceedings for Indigent
Petitioners, 54 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1140 (2005).
279. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46-49, 53-54 (1971) (limiting the exceptions to
cases of immediate "irreparable injury" and a showing of "bad faith and harassment").
280. See Daniel Jordan Simon, Abstention Preemption: How the Federal Courts Have
Opened the Door to the Eradication of 'Our Federalism, '99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1355, 1364-65
(2005) (discussing an exception to Younger where the constitutional injury is procedural in
nature).
281. Mannes v. Gillespie, 967 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1992).
282. Id. at 1312.
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The court explained:
The Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy-"nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life and limb"-"is not against being twice punished,
but against being twice put in jeopardy." Because full vindication
of the right necessarily requires intervention before trial, federal
courts will entertain pretrial habeas petitions that raise a colorable
claim of double jeopardy.
283
If the Mannes court had abstained from hearing the plaintiff's petition
on Younger grounds and required her to stand trial again before she could
return to the federal courts for habeas relief, her request for relief would
have been moot by the time she made it back to federal court. Mannes
would have already suffered the procedural harm of being put in jeopardy
twice, regardless of whether she was convicted twice.
Similarly, federal courts have allowed exceptions to Younger in order
to protect a defendant's right to a speedy trial. For example, in Braden v.
30th Judicial Circuit Court, the Supreme Court allowed a habeas petition
by an Alabama prisoner who claimed that he had been denied his right to
a speedy trial on a pending charge in Kentucky.2" Even though the
petitioner had not been tried on his Kentucky indictment and the Court
could have ordered him to raise his speedy trial argument as a defense to
that prosecution, the Court explained why federal jurisdiction was proper:
"Petitioner does not... seek at this time to litigate a federal defense to a
criminal charge, but only to demand enforcement of the Commonwealth's
affirmative constitutional obligation to bring him promptly to trial.,
285
Again, if the federal court had abstained and required the petitioner to
await a trial on Kentucky's timeline, it is quite likely that he would have
suffered the harm of unreasonable delay between indictment and trial that
the Constitution protects against. At that point, even if petitioner returned
to federal court seeking habeas relief, he would have been able to seek
dismissal of any conviction, but he would not have been able to protect the
other interests that the right to a speedy trial safeguards (namely, the right
not to be incarcerated for an unnecessarily long time and the anxiety posed
by a prolonged period of accusation). 286 Thus, some federal courts have
recognized instances where, notwithstanding the Younger abstention
doctrine, immediate action by a federal court is required to prevent a party
from suffering a procedural harm that the Constitution prohibits.
A class action claim by indigent defendants seeking prospective
283. Id. (citations omitted). See also Sprague v. Oregon, Civ. No. 06-1277-TC, 2007
WL 1138462, at *3 (D. Or. Apr. 16, 2007) (discussing the double jeopardy exception).
284. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
285. Id at 489-90.
286. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 654 (1992).
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improvements to the state defense function fits squarely within this line of
procedural exception cases. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
protect a person from being prosecuted by the state without the effective
assistance of counsel.28  Moreover, as the Eleventh Circuit explained,
"The sixth amendment protects rights that do not affect the outcome of a
trial. ' '21 Without the safeguard of effective assistance at trial, the criminal
process is fundamentally unfair and may generate inaccurate results. In
jurisdictions where indigent clients are not guaranteed effective assistance,
allowing the state trial to go forward is in itself a violation against which
the Constitution protects. The defendant may be wrongfully convicted,
she may receive a harsher sentence than competent counsel could have
secured, and she may not have a well-preserved record for the appellate
and habeas process.
Just as the criminal defendants in Mannes and Braden were not
required to exhaust state legal remedies before seeking federal relief, so
too should defendants seeking prospective improvement to a defense
system be given a federal forum. If they are not, and the federal court
relegates a defendant to the habeas process and requires a defendant to
exhaust state legal remedies, the court overlooks the defendant's right to
vindicate her Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel on a prospective
basis. Moreover, by the time the defendant returns to federal court the
constitutional harm that the Sixth Amendment protects against-the
deleterious effects of ineffective assistance of counsel-has already been
suffered by the defendant, and the federal court in a habeas posture is too
late to remedy that harm. If the procedural exceptions announced in the
speedy trial and double jeopardy settings are to have any meaningful
application elsewhere, they should apply to prospective Sixth Amendment
claims.
Third, there are other doctrines that, like the abstention doctrine, limit
the remedial power of the federal courts on federalism grounds-for
example, sovereign immunity and exhaustion-and these doctrines
similarly permit exceptions. 9  By analogy, indigent defendants seeking
prospective, injunctive relief should have access to the federal courts
notwithstanding the abstention doctrine.290
287. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) ("It has long been
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.").
288. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1988).
289. See generally Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (describing sovereign
immunity doctrine and its exceptions); Daniels v. Area Plan Comm'n, 306 F.3d 445, 456-58
(7th Cir. 2000) (describing and applying futility exception to exhaustion requirement).
290. It is important to acknowledge what informal conversations with practitioners
have conveyed: the creation of a federal forum on the basis of the arguments I set out in
this section is an ambitious undertaking. Federal judges may be reticent to take the kind of
action I suggest herein for fear that such action provides no limiting principle, thereby
opening the door to exactly the type of federal intrusion into state court criminal
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Finally, abstention is a prudential doctrine291 and federal courts should
not allow a state to invoke federalism as a shield with which to deflect its
constitutional responsibility to provide effective representation for its poor
citizens. At some point, the principles of equity and comity must yield to
the Sixth Amendment itself. Could a state require its counties to provide
indigent defense representation and then stand by while the counties
refused to do so? In some states, like Mississippi, something very close to
that scenario is the status quo.292 Accordingly, where plaintiffs can
demonstrate systematic deprivations of the right to counsel, injunctive
relief should be available in federal court.
Some may wonder why a plaintiff would want to be in federal court
given its current composition and orientation towards federalism. 93
Others may argue that the federal courts have not been very effective at
overseeing social policy reform through structural injunctions in the past.
294
In addition to the evidence I have already offered that suggests state court
judges may be disinclined to address systemic deficiencies in a criminal
defense system,295 I offer three responses to these concerns. First,
regardless of whether one thinks that federal judges have been effective at
instituting reforms like desegregation or improving prison conditions,
there is good reason to think that these judges would be uniquely skilled at
overseeing the implementation of a revamped public defense system.296
While a judge may know very little about education policy, she certainly
knows a great deal about lawyering-what counts as good lawyering and
what resources a good lawyer needs at her disposal. Second, there is
reason to think that federal courts may not be hostile to class action Sixth
proceedings barred by Younger. In light of that reality, practitioners may be best served by
making the case for a federal forum in a jurisdiction where the plaintiffs can argue that the
public defense system is such a shambles that there is a constructive absence of counsel.
See, e.g., Amended Complaint, Stinson v. Fulton County, No. 1:94-CV-75 (N.D. Ga. May 1,
1994) (arguing that defendant class members had no representation at critical stages of the
state's prosecution of their case and resulting in consent decree to improve conditions).
291. See Adibi v. Cal. Bd. of Pharmacy, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(explaining that Younger abstention is not based upon lack of jurisdiction in federal court,
but rather upon principles of comity that suggest a federal court should give deference to
state court proceedings in some factual scenarios).
292. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
293. See, e.g., Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 441-42 (2004) (enforcing a
district court judge's consent decree, but discussing the danger that "enforcement of
consent decrees can undermine the sovereign interests and accountability of state
governments"). See generally Lino A. Graglia, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich: Federalism in
the Rehnquist Court, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 761 (2008) (describing shift from
Supreme Court's New Deal era decisions to federalism focus of the Rehnquist court).
294. See generally Ross SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE
(2003).
295. See supra notes 37-53 and accompanying text.
296. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 26, at 499 ("[Jjudges have the knowledge and
experience to evaluate the efficiency of indigent defense systems.").
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Amendment suits. Even the most devout federalist judge may very well be
equally committed to textual integrity and rule of law. Where states
blatantly fail to safeguard the Sixth Amendment - a right that has been
deemed essential to safeguarding all others297-even conservative federal
judges may be willing to step in.298 Third, even if the current federal bench
does not seem likely to offer a sympathetic ear to indigent defendant
plaintiffs, its composition is neither static nor permanent.
In some jurisdictions, a federal forum may be required to bring about
lasting reform of public defense services. In the third generation of
indigent defense litigation, plaintiffs' counsel should consider whether they
are in a jurisdiction where the federal bench may be amenable to the
arguments identified herein. If so, they should argue that federal judges
should not shy away from the responsibility to hear these cases on
abstention grounds, especially where plaintiffs can demonstrate historical
and ongoing miscarriages of justice.299
Having identified issues for impact litigation attorneys to consider in
future suits of this kind, I now turn to discussing steps that the individual
practitioner can take when she is working in a jurisdiction where litigation
is not imminent and the defense system is failing.
B. Strategies for the Individual Defense Attorney
There are some jurisdictions where there simply is no organization
that can or will bring suit to improve indigent defense services. Individual
defense attorneys working in the midst of an indigent defense crisis-
where caseloads are excessive, resources are scarce, and training is
nonexistent-must be able to take some steps to improve the quality of the
representation they provide. In this part of the article, I outline several
steps that these individual defense attorneys can take when working in the
midst of such a crisis.
297. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) ("[T]he right to counsel safeguards
the other rights deemed essential for the fair prosecution of a criminal proceeding.")
298. Justice Scalia's opinion in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), may offer a
useful analogy. While one does not usually think of Justice Scalia as sympathetic to the
interests of criminal defendants, in Kyllo he wrote for the majority, rejecting the state's
warrantless use of a thermal-imaging device to detect marijuana within the home. In that
case, Scalia's opinion emphasized the Court's historical protection of the home from
warrantless searches-that is, historical accuracy trumped the concerns of law and order
that pressed for increasingly technological warrantless search methods. See id at 40. By
analogy, one can envision a conservative judge emphasizing textual integrity and rule of law
over a state's vague claims of prosecutorial interference.
299. In light of the roadblocks to securing a federal forum for these suits, direct
legislative action may be necessary. See Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel
Act: A Congressional Solution to the Indigent Defense Crisis (Soc. Sci. Resarch Network
Working Paper Series, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1448058.
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1. Remind State Judges of Their Inherent Authority
Even a state court judge who is reluctant to order sweeping relief may
be willing to assert her authority over her own courtroom, and defense
attorneys can remind judges that they can dramatically improve the quality
of indigent defense services by asserting that authority. Specifically,
defense attorneys can request that judges simply not allow underfunded
cases to move forward. In Georgia and New Mexico judges have recently
done just that.3°
In addition, a judge can grant caseload relief to an overworked
individual defense attorney. A recent ABA Ethics Opinion advises
indigent defense counsel to refuse to accept new cases or to withdraw from
existing ones when their excessive caseload prevents them from providing
effective representation.30 1 Citing this Ethics Opinion, a judge can relieve
a defense attorney of cases, thereby increasing the chances that defense
counsel can provide effective representation to her remaining clients. As
solutions go, this one is certainly imperfect. First, in some jurisdictions
where all the defense counsel are seriously overworked, there may be no
available replacement counsel. In such a case, a separate ethical issue is
implicated: continuity of representation.3 2 Second, an excessive caseload
may not be the only hindrance to effective representation. It is entirely
possible that a judge may provide caseload relief, only to realize that
defense counsel's performance is still significantly hampered by a lack of
investigative and expert assistance, training and experience. Despite that,
caseload relief is consistent with the recent ABA Ethics Opinion, and at
the very least, it may draw attention to the wider array of indigent defense
issues.
Finally, defense counsel can ask state court judges to document the
crisis in their courtrooms and across the state. For example, in 2005, New
York's Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye created a Commission on the Future of
Indigent Defense Services, widely known as the Kaye Commission, to
300. See, e.g., Greg Land, Judge Confronts State over Nichols Funding, DAILY
REPORT (Fulton County, Ga.), Oct. 11, 2007, at 1 (describing judge's position that unless
legislature provides adequate funds for public defense, capital case will not move beyond
voire dire phase); Scott Sandlin, Death Penalty Out in Guard Killing, ALBUQUERQUE J.,
Apr. 4, 2008, at C1 (documenting New Mexico trial judge barring state from seeking death
penalty citing inadequate funds from legislature).
301. ABA Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, Formal Opinion 06-
441 (2006) (describing ethical obligations of lawyers who represent indigent criminal
defendants when excessive caseloads interfere with competent and diligent representation).
For an analysis of this Ethics Opinion and its consequences, see Jessica Hafkin, A Lawyer's
Ethical Obligation to Refuse New Cases or to Withdraw from Existing Ones When Faced
with Excessive Caseloads That Prevent Him from Providing Competent and Diligent
Representation to Indigent Defendants, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 657 (2007).
302. See THE TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 13, Principle 7 (requiring that "[t]he same
attorney continuously represent[] the client until completion of the case").
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evaluate the state's indigent defense system and make reform
recommendations.3"3 The Commission's final report, submitted to Chief
Judge Kaye in June 2006, concluded that "New York's current fragmented
system of county-operated and largely county-financed indigent defense
services fails to satisfy the state's constitutional and statutory obligations to
protect the rights of the indigent accused."3" The report has been a critical
piece of empirical evidence in the systemic litigation currently pending in
New York regarding the lack of a statewide public defender system."5
Similarly, Nevada Supreme Court's Chief Justice William Maupin
took action to study and implement much-needed indigent defense
reforms in the state by creating the Commission on Indigent Defense.3 °6
Justice Michael Cherry, who was appointed chair of the Commission,
noted that reforming indigent defense in the state was in the interest of all
citizens, not just the clients of a public defense system: "'[W]hen court
appointed attorneys are ineffective or inadequate, it sometimes results in
cases being reversed and new trials ordered. That is costly for taxpayers
and an additional burden on the court system. The best solution is to have
competent, experienced, and effective attorneys available to represent
indigent defendants.""'3 7 Other state court judges can begin to follow in
this path by documenting the indigent defense crisis so that it can be
addressed in a productive, holistic manner.
2. Remind State Judges of Their Authority to Order Adequate Funds
Defense counsel working in the midst of a fiscal crisis also may seek
a judicial order requiring the legislature to allocate sufficient funds to the
defense function. State supreme courts often have statutory and
constitutional authority to supervise lower courts and to oversee the
implementation of the right to counsel.3"8 Defense counsel can remind
state judges of the sweeping authority that these provisions provide. For
example, in the Lavallee case discussed, supra, plaintiffs' counsel relied
upon a Massachusetts law that granted:
The supreme judicial court shall have general superintendence of
all courts of inferior jurisdiction to correct and prevent errors and
abuses therein if no other remedy is expressly provided; and it
may issue all writs and processes to such courts and to
303. COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., supra note 146.
304. Id. at 15.
305. See Hurrell-Harring Complaint, supra note 102, at 61-67.
306. See Press Release, Nev. Supreme Court, supra note 196.
307. Id. (quoting Justice Cherry).
308. See Michael L. Buenger, Of Money and Judicial Independence: Can Inherent
Powers Protect State Courts in Tough Fiscal Times?, 2 KY. L.J. 979, 1017-19 (2004)
(discussing expanding power, including supervisory powers, of state courts).
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corporations and individuals which may be necessary to the
furtherance of justice and to the regular execution of the laws.3 °9
While recognizing that the Court's "discretionary power of review"
under Massachusetts law was "extraordinary," and "available only in the
most exceptional circumstances," the Court invoked this power in
Lavallee.31' Thus, litigants can direct state court judges to state law and
state constitutional provisions that grant extraordinary power for unusual
circumstances. On this authority, defense counsel can ask state judges to
order the legislature to allocate sufficient funds for the defense system by a
certain date.31'
Thus, even the individual defense attorney can take steps to address
an ongoing crisis when systemic improvements are not on the horizon.
Each piecemeal action that a state judge takes to address a crisis may be
helpful in an individual case and can draw the legislature's attention to
flaws in the defense system.
CONCLUSION
The indigent defense crisis must be addressed as a matter of fairness
and constitutional accuracy, but also as a matter of community safety and
sound resource management. Not only does poor quality representation
result in wrongful convictions, but also overturned convictions, costly
retrials, and unprosecuted criminals on the street. As this article describes,
recent suits designed to improve indigent defense systems have enjoyed
greater success than their predecessors, and there is good reason to think
that future litigants bringing the third generation of these suits can
capitalize-and even improve-upon these recent suits. In the short term,
the best case scenario for impact litigation attorneys may be the success of
a regional approach, whereby successful suits in one state prompt
legislative action in neighboring states. In the long run, the best outcome
the defense community can hope for is the creation of well functioning,
fair, and effective indigent defense systems that render obsolete the need
for this kind of systemic litigation altogether.
309. MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211, § 3 (West 2005). See also Lavallee v. Justices in
the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 900 (Mass. 2004).
310. Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 902 (internal quotation marks omitted).
311. It is worth noting that some may raise a separation of powers objection to the
courts directing the legislature to allocate funds. Scholars have noted that state courts can
and have done this in the past without offending separation principles. See Effectively
Ineffective, supra note 26, at 1745 ("One way in which courts have justified ordering
legislatures to expend funds is by asserting that the provision of indigent defense, and
therefore the compensation of attorneys providing that service, is a judicial function; it then
follows that by underfunding indigent defense, the legislature infringes upon the judiciary's
powers, which flips the separation of powers argument entirely.").
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